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Lay upon the sinner his sin,
Lay upon the transgressor his transgression,
Punish him a little when he breaks loose,
Do not drive him too hard or he perishes;
Would that a lion had ravaged mankind
Rather than the flood.
The Epic of Gilgamesh (Tab. XI)1
And everyone who listens to these words of mine 
but does not act on them will be like the fool who 
built his house on sand. The rain fell, the floods 
came, and the winds blew and buffeted the house. 
And it collapsed and was completely ruined.
Matthew 7:26-7
1 Translation by Sandars (1972). 
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ABSTRACT
Insurance markets are a means by which societies cope with the 
rising frequency and intensity of natural disasters, particularly 
floods. By influencing perceptions of flood risk, as well as the 
costs of building and maintaining real property, these markets 
create a unique set of financial incentives that inform individual 
decisions related to the built environment. This thesis will 
examine the links between flood insurance markets in the United 
States and patterns of urban development along the periphery 
of floodplains, as delineated in the official Flood Insurance Rate 
Maps (FIRMs) produced by the federal government. These 
maps—and the insurance costs that they help determine—act 
as economic signals that influence the decisions of individuals 
and firms. Spatiotemporal analysis of real estate tax appraisal 
data compiled for Harris County, Texas, finds some evidence 
of heightened building activity within the “marginal 100-year” 
floodplain, suggesting that an incentive exists to build just 
outside the floodplain boundary, even though, empirically, it is a 
poor predictor of the actuarial risk of flooding.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest challenges facing cities in the twenty-first century is the risk of 
natural disaster. This is especially true for coastal and riverine cities, due to the confluence 
of two factors: an increase in the percentage of the global population living in them, and 
in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather-related events that threaten them. One 
consequence of this is the rising economic toll of each successive disaster, and a renewed focus 
on the role of financial instruments, particularly insurance, in coping with losses. This thesis 
will examine the linkages between insurance markets and patterns of urban development in 
areas exposed to the risk of natural catastrophes. The analysis will focus on the structure of 
flood insurance markets in the United States, in particular the role of the federal government 
in determining insurance costs and requirements at a local level. The hypothesis, that the 
incentives created by this market intervention manifest in the built environment, will be 
tested by spatiotemporal analysis of real estate development activity on the periphery of flood 
plains.
Thus, risk perception and incentives will play central roles in the analytical framework 
developed in this paper. This is because policymakers, seeking to achieve the goal of greater 
resiliency to natural disasters—i.e., the ability to recover from catastrophic events quickly, 
efficiently, and with limited loss of economic value—attempt to encourage the desired urban 
development models by shaping individual financial incentives. In developed economies this 
is most often done by intervening in private insurance markets (Barnett 1999; Grove 2012; 
Abbott 2014; Aerts et al. 2016). Yet this approach can result in a systematic mispricing of 
PART ONE
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disaster risk, creating exactly the opposite incentives of those that were intended, namely, as 
this paper will show, the incentive to develop in areas that are prone to natural catastrophes. 
This phenomenon can be observed in changes in the built environment adjacent to floodplains 
in the US, an outcome of the design of the flood insurance system itself. As it happens, risk 
and incentives were foremost in the minds of the system’s original architects; yet, as Robert 
Burns cautioned, “The best-laid plans of mice and men / Go oft awry” (1994).
A. Thesis Outline
This paper is organized as follows. Section II will provide background and a review of the 
relevant literature concerning the following topics: the scope and urgency of the environmental 
challenge facing cities in the form or increasingly severe natural hazards, especially flooding 
(II.A); the economic theory underpinning the insurance markets that indemnify these hazards 
(II.B); the origins and recent experience of the present national flood insurance scheme in the 
United States (II.C-D); a detailed focus on the program’s inherent flaws (II.E); and finally 
on the technical mechanism that lies at the heart of the program’s system of incentives: the 
flood insurance rate map, or FIRM (II.F). Section III will discuss the model for analyzing 
spatiotemporal change in the built environment along the perimeters of floodplains, as 
delineated by FIRMs, as well as discuss data sources utilized in this analysis. Section IV 
will present a case study illustrating how the dynamics of incentives and risk-perception 
discussed in Section II manifest in Harris County, Texas, which encompasses the Houston 
metropolitan area. In Section V, spatiotemporal analysis of Harris County’s development 
pattern in relation to the floodplain geography defined by its FIRMs (using real estate tax 
appraisal data and following the methodology developed in Section III), will demonstrate 
empirically the effects described in the case study. Finally, Section VI will present general 
conclusions, policy implications, and recommendations for further research.
10
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II. BACKGROUND & LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a rich literature on the subject of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
of the US, and similar programs in other countries. The ways in which the structure of the 
NFIP shapes the incentives of individuals and real estate development firms—as well as the 
social outcomes of the decisions these incentives foster—have been examined through the 
lenses of economics, sociology, political science, and behavioral psychology. The question of 
why individuals choose to build or purchase a residence (or any property), and to live and 
work in structures at risk of natural hazards, is related to the question of how they perceive 
that risk, and how they evaluate the costs and benefits of avoiding risk or acting to mitigate 
its effects (Burby 2006; Frondel et al. 2017). This section will review the existing answers 
to these questions, their implications for the future of the NFIP, and some of the proposals 
presented in the literature for reforming the program. We begin—as in many of the papers 
discussed below—with why these questions are of great urgency to urban policy in the US 
and internationally.
A. Increasing Frequency & Costs of Natural Disasters
The term “natural hazard,” as many have noted, is in one sense a misnomer: natural events 
such as storms, floods, wildfires, earthquakes, etc., exact a toll—in lives and damaged or 
destroyed property—only inasmuch as human beings place themselves and their structures 
and personal possessions in the path of such events (Chen 2014; Doyle and Patterson 2009; 
Abbott op. cit.; Cutter et al. 2000). As one paper succinctly puts it, “natural hazards [are 
created by] the juxtaposition of physical, social, and economic factors in space and time” 
(Doyle and Patterson op. cit.). We cannot escape the element of individual choice in assessing 
the risks of natural disasters: most other species have evolved to instinctively avoid natural 
11
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risk in all its forms. Yet human beings, increasingly, exhibit exactly the opposite tendency.
In the US, between 1970 and 2010, coastal shoreline counties1 (CSCs) added 125 people 
per square mile (p/mi²), versus a national average of thirty-six p/mi² (NOAA 2013); the 
population density of the CSCs in 2016 was over 192 p/mi², over three times the national 
average, a number projected to rise by 8.3% by 2020 (ibid.). By 2020, over 133 million people, 
or 39% of the estimated US population in that year, will live2 in CSCs (ibid.). According to 
US Census data, of the five counties with the highest population growth in 2010-6, four 
were CSCs (see Figure 1, next page). Data on the increase in population density over the 
same period tell a more varied picture, as shown in Figure 2 (next page), yet still indicate a 
general trend toward densification in CSCs along the eastern seaboard of the US.3 This trend 
is not specific to the US—in China and Bangladesh, for example, the rate of increase in the 
coastal population was twice the national average between 1990 and 2004 (Neumann et al. 
2015)—and it is expected to continue: by one estimate, between 2000 and 2030, 100 million 
people around the world will move within the boundaries of a 100-year floodplain4 (ibid.). 
This migration pattern has tracked urbanization over the past half-century: in 1950, 29.6% 
of the world’s population lived in cities, and there were eighty-three cities with greater than 
one million residents; by 2010, 51.6% of humanity was urbanized, with over four hundred 
cities in the “million-plus” category and nineteen with populations of ten million or more 
(UN-DESA 2014). Of the ten largest cities in 1950, five—with a total of 36 million residents—
were located within low elevation coastal zones (LECZs);5  in 2010, eight of the top ten largest 
cities were located in LECZs, with over 156 million residents between them.
1 Coastal shoreline counties are those that “are directly adjacent to open ocean, major estuaries, and the Great Lakes” 
(NOAA op. cit.). The NOAA notes that these counties “bear the most direct effects of coastal hazards and host the majority of 
economic production associated with coastal and ocean resources” (ibid.).
2 The NOAA report only counts full-time residents, not part-time residents or holiday-goers. Therefore, the analysis 
misses the impact of the construction of vacation homes and hotels or other temporary-occupancy structures. These categories 
of assets are significant drivers of real estate investment, and must also be insured against losses.
3 Indeed, the fact that population growth is outpacing density may be an indicator of sprawl, which is a major contrib-
uting factor to the severity of flooding, as will be discussed later in this paper (see Section II.F and Section IV, below).
4 A “100-year flood” has a 1% probability of occurring in a given year (see Section II.D, below).
5 1-20 meters above mean sea level.
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Figure 1: Change in population, 2000-16, by US county. The spectrum ranges from dark red (decline 
in population) to dark blue (increase in population), with pale yellow indicating little or no change in 
population. NOAA-designated coastal shoreline counties are outlined in gray. Though there is a degree 
of regional variation, there is generally a preponderance of blue within coastal counties, particularly 
southern Florida, Texas’s central Gulf Coast, southern California, the San Francisco Bay area, and the 
northwest counties of Washington State, along Puget Sound. Sources: US Census Bureau, 2000 SF1 
100% Data & American Community Survey, 5-Year Estimates (2012-6); NOAA; ESRI.
Figure 2: Change in population density (persons/sq. mi.), 2000-16, by US county (same spectrum as 
previous figure). Sources: US Census Bureau, 2000 SF1 100% Data & American Community Survey, 
5-Year Estimates (2006-10 & 2012-6); NOAA; ESRI.
13
Haney 2018
Given this massive movement of human settlements toward the coasts, one might 
reasonably conclude that the risks of the natural hazards to which these areas are exposed 
would be decreasing.1 Data suggest that the opposite is true. Between 1980 and 1990, 
Munich Re, a German reinsurance company, recorded 2,526 natural loss events classified as 
either hydrological (floods, landslides, or tsunamis) or meteorological (storms and extreme 
temperatures), resulting in $329 billion in damage; between 2005 and 2015, there were 5,135 
such events, costing $1.178 trillion (constant 2017 US dollars).2 Worldwide, there were an 
average of 335 weather-related3 disasters per year in the decade after 2005, a 14% increase 
over the preceding decade, and more than double the annual rate in 1980 to 1989 (UN-ODRR 
and CRED 2015). The economic toll of these events is extreme. In the US, an estimated 
90% of natural disaster losses involve flooding (Abbott op. cit.; Doyle and Patterson op. cit.). 
1 Or, alternatively, that a powerful incentive existed to locate in these areas, compensating for the risks.
2 Munich Re, NatCatService; retrieved Nov 2017.
3 Hydrological and meteorological.
Coastal Shoreline Counties Non-CSCs
Population
Total Change, 2000-16 11,534,974 25,647,630
Population Density
Persons/mi2, 2016 192.05 65.02




Table A: Comparison of population and real estate tax value statistics for coastal shoreline counties 
and non-CSCs in the US, 2000-16. Even though population growth in non-CSCs was almost twice as 
high as in CSCs, the latter account for approximately 18.25% of the total US land area, a fact reflected 
in the much higher density of CSCs in 2016. Further, growth in aggregate assessed real estate tax value 
in CSCs outpaced non-CSCs, an indication that the per-capita “value-at-risk” of coastal communities 
has significantly increased since 2000, relative to those in the interior. Source: US Census Bureau, 
2000 SF3 Sample Data & American Community Survey, 5-Year Estimates (2012-6).
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In the two decades to 2000, average annual losses attributed to floods in the US were $2.4 
to $4 billion (ibid.; Mileti 1999), and were increasing at an annual rate of 3.45% (Downton 
and Pielke 2000). Brody et al. (2011) found that “average annual property damage caused 
by floods has increased fifty-four times [since the 1960s], from $51 million in [the] 1960s, to 
$2.77 billion in the 2000s.” These losses are reflected in annual payout data on NFIP claims, 
which, prior to 2004, never exceeded $2 billion. They rose to an average of $2.91 billion per 
year in 2004-16, increasing on average 4.6% per annum, almost ten percentage points higher 
than the previous decade (see Figure 3, facing page).
As with the shift in population described above, this trend is not limited to the US, and 
it is expected to intensify. One study of the world’s 136 largest cities found that average 
annual global flood losses are projected to rise from $6 billion in 2005 to $52 billion by 2050, 
even if mean sea levels do not rise and coastal erosion does not accelerate over the period 
(Corfee-Morlot et al. 2013). If natural hazards do become more acute, however, the estimate 
of annual losses rises to $63 billion (ibid.). The losses will likely be highly concentrated, and 
cities are especially vulnerable: the study found that three American cities (Miami, New 
York, and New Orleans) and Guangzhou, China, may account for fully 43% of the projected 
global losses over the period 2005 to 2050 (ibid.). The risks to human life and prosperity are 
grave: of the top twenty cities ranked in the study by projected average annual flood losses 
in the year 2050, 55% had populations greater than five million in 2005, 65% recorded GDP 
growth of faster than 5%, and 95% were exposed to the risk of recurring severe hurricanes, 
tropical storms, and flooding (ibid.). In recent years, national and local governments have 
begun to explore various means of forestalling these losses. The reaction of most individuals 
and businesses, however, is first and foremost to obtain financial protection against them, in 
the form of insurance (Chen op. cit.).
15
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Figure 3: Annual payouts on NFIP claims versus premium revenue, 1978-2016. Prior to 2004, total 
dollars paid out on NFIP claims had never exceed $2 billion in a single year; from 2004-16, annual 
payouts averaged almost $2.91 billion. Source: FEMA.
Figure 4: Percent change in aggregate notional value of coverage for all NFIP policies compared to 
changes in number of policies and the S&P Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index. In some years, 
the change in notional value is mainly driven by an increase in the gross number of policies, while in 
some years it is driven by changes in home values. Source: Dow Jones LLC, St. Louis Fed, FEMA.
16
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B. Risk, Insurance & Urban Development: A General Framework
Flood insurance in the US, as mentioned, is organized under the aegis of a single, 
government-administered national program, the NFIP. Before discussing how this 
arrangement came about, it is important to understand the economic theory underpinning 
the program’s structure. Insurance is a mechanism of coping with the risk of economic loss 
(Chen op. cit.). An individual building a home on the banks of a river or at the seashore may 
recognize the possibility of a flood or severe storm damaging or destroying his property, and 
may be willing to pay another party a given sum in exchange for the promise to cover the 
costs of any such damage, should it occur. In the view of the second party—the insurer—the 
question is how much that sum, or “premium,” should be, which depends on the probability 
that the indemnified event will occur. The calculation of such probabilities falls under a 
branch of statistical mathematics known as actuarial science, which provides a foundation 
for the insurer’s assessment of the risk that the promised coverage will have to be paid out. 
The premium, in essence, is the “price” of that risk, the fundamental basis of any insurance 
contract.
As the next section will show, the price of disaster risk is an important factor in determining 
development patterns—location, usage, density, construction methods—especially in denser 
urban areas (Brody et al. op. cit.). For instance, most residential real estate is only developed 
and sold if it can be mortgaged by the purchaser, and most mortgage lenders will offer 
financing only if the underlying collateral—i.e., the property itself—can be insured against 
hazards such as flooding or hurricanes. Thus, in a properly functioning market, the price of 
risk serves as a signal to lenders, real estate developers, and individuals (Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan 2011).1 The higher the risk of disaster, the higher the insurance premiums 
will be, and the higher the costs of obtaining and servicing mortgage loans. This mechanism 
1 It should be noted that even if the measure of risk is properly functioning as a price signal, it may be offset by the 
potential reward. In the case of lenders or developers, risk and reward can usually be weighed by financial analysis. In the 
case of individual homeowners, choices are often hedonic, and thus more difficult to quantify. This is what makes the analysis 
17
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requires that both the lender and the borrower have an equal and transparent view of the 
associated risk—or, in economic jargon, that “information is symmetric” in the market. When 
information symmetry holds, the insurance premium price signal helps shape the economic 
incentives of individuals, feeding into mortgage rates and home values. However, when this 
price is artificially reduced through government subsidies, then the price signal does not 
function properly (Burby op. cit.). If an individual’s cost of maintaining coverage for flooding 
or hurricane winds is relatively low, he may assume that the risk of those disasters actually 
occurring is also low—the information is asymmetric (Aerts et al. op. cit.).
If this is the theory behind the design of insurance-provision schemes, the question becomes 
whether the theory holds up in practice. The next section considers this question in the 
context of the history of the NFIP.
C. History of Flood Insurance in the U.S.
The NFIP was created by an act of Congress in 1968, and was the culmination of a long 
debate about the role of the federal government in facilitating relief from natural disasters. 
This role was not always taken for granted. In February 1887, President Grover Cleveland 
vetoed a bill passed by Congress to appropriate $10,000 (around $270,000 in 2016 US dollars) 
to buy seed for Texas farmers hit by one of the worst droughts in the state’s history. He 
commented at the time, 
I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution, and I do not believe 
that the power and duty of the general government ought to be extended to the relief of 
individual suffering which is in no manner properly related to the public service or benefit.2
This sentiment may seem callous when judged by modern standards, but it was by no means 
uncommon in Cleveland’s day.3 It was not until 1915 that the federal government first 
attempted in this paper challenging (see Section III, below).
2 President Cleveland, “Veto Message” (1887).
3 Indeed, the New York Democrat went on to win Texas in the following year’s presidential race, though he lost the 
18
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appropriated disaster relief in the shape of subsidized loans, and this practice remained 
exceptional before 1950. The federal disaster response typically came in the form of personnel, 
supplies, and transportation assistance, rather than direct financial aid to the affected 
localities (Moss 1999). Such efforts required authorization by specific acts of Congress, and 
no national response mechanism existed on a permanent basis (Barnett op. cit.).
As American financial markets became more complex in the late 19th-century, private 
institutions initially stepped in to provide security to homeowners, which in most cases took 
the form of insurance. US insurance companies began offering policies to protect against 
flood losses on residential and commercial real estate in 1895 (Barry 1997). The greatest 
challenge faced by the industry, as with any nascent insurance market, was access to reliable 
data on the frequency and severity of floods (Kunreuther 1996). These actuarial data are 
essential to pricing flood risk, and thus to the premiums paid by policyholders (ibid.).1 Floods, 
in particular, are notoriously difficult to predict, and in its earliest days the industry suffered 
high losses (Moss op. cit.). Then, in the spring of 1927, following torrential rainfall the previous 
autumn, the Mississippi River and several of its tributaries flooded along a five-hundred mile 
stretch from Dorena, Missouri, to New Orleans, Louisiana. It was the worst riverine disaster 
in US history, inundating over 29,000 square miles across ten states in up to thirty feet of 
water. Over six hundred thousand people fled their homes and hundreds were killed; the toll 
in livestock and crops lost was devastating. Insurance claims filed in the aftermath of the 
disaster led to the bankruptcies of numerous underwriters, crippling the industry (Barry 
op. cit.) and leaving homeowners completely at the mercy of the as yet underdeveloped (and 
underfunded) federal disaster response mechanisms.
The Great Mississippi Flood had a profound impact on public perceptions of the role of 
government in responding to natural disasters, leading to the passage of the Flood Control 
election to the Republican challenger, Benjamin Harrison.
1 As discussed in Section II.B, above, insurance premiums can be understood as the “price” of flood risk.
19
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Act of 1928. Nevertheless, for two decades afterward, in the absence of a functioning private 
flood insurance market, the federal government was obliged to intervene in the aftermath 
of major floods with ad hoc humanitarian relief (Moss op. cit.). The disadvantages of this 
system were glaringly obvious, but it would be several decades before Congress took action. 
In June 1951, devastating flooding of the Kansas and Missouri Rivers—in some places, the 
worst flooding since the 1927 Mississippi disaster, displacing more than a half-million people 
and resulting in $8.5 billion in damages (in 2016 US dollars)—prompted the administration 
of President Harry Truman to propose a “national system of flood disaster insurance… based 
upon private insurance with reinsurance by the Government,”2 intended to rectify this market 
failure. In draft legislation sent to Congress the following year, Truman insisted that the 
private sector should return to the flood insurance market, noting that his program “should 
not compete with private insurance companies.”3 He called for a federal reinsurance fund 
to “make it possible for private companies to write flood insurance at reasonable rates and 
noted that rates could be lowered by a “nationwide pooling system.” This original plan called 
for capping coverage amounts and premiums, proportional deductibles (i.e., tied to the value 
of the underlying property and the level of risk), and authorized the federal home mortgage 
agencies to require insurance coverage in exchange for mortgage guarantees. Thus, though 
Truman’s proposal was not adopted—it would take another sixteen years and a push by the 
administration of President Lyndon Johnson for the establishing legislation to pass—the 
rough outlines of what would become the NFIP were already defined.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Betsy, which struck the Gulf Coast in September 1965, 
Johnson empaneled a special task force to investigate the possibility of reconstituting 
flood and hurricane insurance markets in the US.4 The task force submitted its report, A 
2 President Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Requesting Additional Funds for the Rehabilitation of the 
Flood Stricken Areas of the Midwest” (1951).
3 President Truman, “Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation on a National System of 
Flood Disaster Insurance” (1952).
4 When Congress appropriated funding for the hurricane relief effort, President Johnson remarked drily that it was 
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Unified National Program for Managing Flood Losses, to Congress in 1966. Among other 
recommendations, the report called for “a national program for flood insurance… [to] promote 
the public interest” of helping victims cope with flood risk and “to discourage unwise occupancy 
of flood-prone areas [emphasis added].”1 It is clear that the authors of the report had in mind 
the concept, discussed above, of insurance premiums acting as a “price signal.” While pooling 
would help spread the economic costs of extreme floods, higher premiums in areas prone to 
them would incentivize individuals to live elsewhere. The two components are codependent: 
if insurance companies were to indemnify homeowners of the risk of losses from flooding 
(and if the government reinsurance scheme was to indemnify the insurance companies), then 
the price paid for that coverage must be proportional to the risk. A report issued in 1966 
by Robert C. Weaver, the first US Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
endorsed the task force’s recommendations:
If the new occupant of such areas [faced with a high risk of flooding] bears the full cost of 
flood insurance premiums, then he has to balance up the advantages and the costs of such 
occupancy. In some circumstances, it may be economic to occupy an area with relatively 
high hazard of flood damage, because the advantages more than offset the unavoidable 
costs. This may often be true for summer homes along the coast… In many situations, 
however, the full costs of occupying high-hazard areas are simply greater than the probable 
advantages. Under those circumstances, flood insurance premiums which place the full 
costs on those benefiting from the location can operate to keep unwarranted occupancy to 
a minimum [emphasis added].2
Ultimately, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was based on the two reports, as well 
as on the Congressional testimony of Weaver and other HUD administrators and experts. As 
“the sixth law passed in eighteen months for the specific purpose of broadening federal aids for the victims of the unusually 
severe succession of disasters experienced since the spring of 1964” (Knowles and Kunreuther 2014).
1 Task Force on Federal Fund Control Policy (1966).
2 US HUD (1966).
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the act explicitly stated, the purpose of the newly-created NFIP would be to
…(1) to encourage State and local governments to make appropriate land use adjustments 
to constrict development of land which is exposed to flood damage and minimize damage 
caused by flood losses, [and] (2) guide the development of proposed future construction, 
where practicable, away from locations which are threatened by flood hazards [emphasis 
added].3
The system, therefore, was designed to manage the losses of floods and storms by making it 
costlier to build and maintain structures in areas of heightened exposure to such calamities, 
thereby shaping incentives (Knowles and Kunreuther op. cit.). The roles of the public and 
private sectors in this system were also clearly defined: private insurers would underwrite 
actuarially sound policies, based on a determination of flood risk made by the federal 
government, which would then provide a reinsurance safety net to those insurers. In this 
way, as both Truman and Weaver envisioned, those who chose to purchase or build property 
in hazardous areas would bear the financial burden of their choice, and thus be properly 
incentivized, while the government would provide information to, and help stabilize, the 
marketplace. The devil, as always, is in the details, and the experience of the NFIP since its 
inception demonstrates the extreme difficulty of implementing such a complex system.
D. The NFIP Since 1968
Given the enormity of the NFIP’s mandate—no less than to foster an entire financial market, 
while engineering the incentives of millions of homeowners across the country—it is not 
surprising that the system required numerous reforms. In 1973, Congress passed the Flood 
Disaster Protection Act, which mandated the purchase of flood insurance for houses within 
newly designated Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs). SFHA boundaries are determined 
by estimations of the “base flood elevation” (BFE) of a flood event that has a 1% chance of 
3 Pub. L. 90-448 (1968).
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occurring in a given year, i.e. once in a century, giving rise to the “100-year flood” as the official 
yardstick for flood risk (and thus flood insurance premiums).1 To help relieve the burden of the 
new insurance requirements, the NFIP’s overseers made the fateful decision to “grandfather 
in” existing properties within the SFHAs at subsidized premium rates of 50-55% below 
actuarial levels2  (CBO 2016). Subsequent reforms, in 1982, 1994, and 2004, addressed issues 
such as: flood insurance premiums for new or significantly improved structures; codifying the 
Community Rating System (CRS), which is used to reward homeowners in communities that 
implement mitigation strategies with lower insurance premiums; and restrictions on payouts 
to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties (SRLPs), as well as creating a pool of capital for these 
properties3 (Abbott op. cit.; Brody et al. 2013; Landry and Li 2014).
The most important change, however, was in the NFIP’s relationship with the private sector. 
In 1979, supervision of the NFIP moved from HUD to the Federal Insurance Administration, 
a branch of the newly-established Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA 
moved to shift risk-bearing from private insurance companies to the federal balance sheet. It 
did this by engaging privately-held “write-your-own” (WYO) policy companies, which would 
market flood insurance policies to homeowners and businesses, and then immediately resell 
those policies to the NFIP, in exchange for a fee to broker the transaction and process the 
claims. Meanwhile, the NFIP would collect the premiums and be responsible for paying out 
claims. FEMA would also be responsible for updating floodplain maps and setting premiums. 
As a result, the program lost any incentive to maintain actuarially sound premiums, and 
was only required to generate enough revenues to cover operating expenses and indemnities 
(payouts) for a “historical average loss year” (Barnett op. cit.; Chen op. cit.; Kousky and 
1 Another key metric, the “500-year flood,” has a 0.2% chance of occurring in a given year. See Section II.F, below, for 
further discussion of the floodplain map methodology.
2 In 2011, an estimated one-fourth of all properties covered by NFIP policies paid subsidized premium rates (Kun-
reuther and Michel-Kerjan op. cit.).




Kunreuther 2014). This system functioned reasonably well—especially after reforms under 
President Ronald Reagan designed to increase premium revenue—and no new congressional 
appropriation was required for the NFIP’s Flood Insurance Fund between 1990 and 2005 
(Abbott op. cit.). The main reason for this was that the program had yet to experience a “low-
probability catastrophic loss year,” i.e., one worse than its estimate of the historical average. 
As recently as 1999, Barnett (op. cit.) could write “the [NFIP] has not been in existence 
long enough to calculate a true long-run expectation of loss.” Even so, the writing was on 
the wall: in the late 1990s, estimates of the increases in premium revenues necessary to 
put the NFIP on an actuarial sound footing for such a year ranged from 75-125% (Leikin 
and Hayes 1996). Subsequently, in seven of the fifteen years between 1996-2011, the dollar 
volume of claims paid out exceeded estimates based on historical average loss ratios. By 
2011, premium revenues would have had to nearly quadruple to cover future claims,4 leading 
to the official conclusion that “it is currently impractical for the NFIP to be actuarially sound 
in the aggregate” (Hayes and Neal 2011).
The “low-probability catastrophic loss year”—and a year of reckoning for the NFIP—came 
in 2005, when Hurricane Katrina devastated the US Gulf Coast, especially the city of New 
Orleans, Louisiana. The damage was so extreme that, in 2005 alone, the NFIP paid out 
more in insurance claims than it had in the previous thirty-seven years of its existence 
combined (Hayes and Neal op. cit.; Kousky and Kunreuther, op. cit.). The Flood Insurance 
Fund had raised only a fraction of its liabilities from premium revenue and was forced to 
borrow from the US Treasury: the NFIP’s debt rose from under $3 billion in 2004 to over $18 
billion two years later. In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, which struck the US’s eastern 
seaboard in October 2012, the debt burden rose to nearly $30 billion (ibid.). In the face of 
this fiscal emergency, Congress passed the most ambitious reform of the NFIP to date, the 
4 Based on a weighted average loss ratio of 379%; prior to the statistically aberrant losses of 2005, this metric was 
around 91%. To correct for this, in its annual rate review, the NFIP underweights 2005 figures (Hayes and Neal op. cit.).
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Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (BWA), in July 2012. The goals of the BWA 
included raising revenue, strengthening mitigation incentives, and reducing administrative 
costs (Abbott op. cit.). Its main provision was the gradual withdrawal of insurance premium 
subsidies, allowing premiums to rise by 25% annually until they were in line with FEMA’s 
actuarial risk assessments (Kousky and Kunreuther op. cit.). The political backlash from 
the BWA was almost immediate. With the flood risk reassessments that FEMA undertook 
after Hurricane Sandy (less than six months after the BWA was passed), many homeowners 
faced rate increases of up to ten times their previous statutory levels.1 Congress, bowing to 
pressure, passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act in March 2014, rolling 
back most of the BWA’s premium provisions (ibid.). As of the time of writing, the NFIP’s 
fundamental revenue problem has not been resolved.
Recent history indicates that such reform will be extremely challenging. In 2017, the 
mounting pressure of the NFIP’s debt burden spurred renewed debate about overhauling 
the program, especially as it drew toward its mandatory five-year renewal deadline that 
fall. Predictably, much of the wind went out of the reform sails after Hurricane Harvey2 hit, 
shifting the policy focus back to the relief of residents of the disaster-stricken areas. Since 
the NFIP must be renewed every five years, and it typically appears on the congressional 
calendar in its fall term, during or immediately after the hurricane season, it could be argued 
that efforts to reform the program face a significant political economy problem (Pidot 2013). 
As with the implementation of the BWA in 2012 and 2013, it becomes politically untenable 
to advocate that federal flood insurance policy should seek to increase the financial burden of 
1 Prior to the BWA, actuarially-based premiums could only be charged to “new or substantially improved” struc-
tures (substantial improvements include rehabilitations, reconstructions, or additions where project costs exceed 50% of the 
market value of the house). As mentioned, structures that were standing when FEMA drew its most recent floodplain maps 
were grandfathered in at heavily discounted premiums. With the BWA, almost all structures were to be charged actuarial 
premiums, although the increases were intended to be gradual. However, because of the damage and destruction wrought by 
Hurricane Sandy, many homeowners in the process of rebuilding saw their rates jump immediately to actuarial levels (from 
$700-800 to nearly $7,000-10,000 per annum in some cases, according to Abbott, op. cit.), adding financial pain to the emotion-
al trauma of the disaster, and creating a political fiasco for the NFIP’s federal overseers (see Kousky and Kunreuther, op. cit., 
for further discussion.)
2 Discussed in Section IV, below.
25
Haney 2018
residents already suffering the ravages of a natural disaster—even though, by the consensus 
of economic theory, empirical observation, and the overwhelming majority of expert opinion, 
getting residents of disaster-prone areas to shoulder a greater share of the financial burden of 
those disasters is exactly what policymakers must do. Only then will the insurance premiums 
paid by these individuals fully serve the function that theory predicts: as a “price signal” 
providing valuable information concerning the actual risk of choosing to locate in one area 
versus another.
Nevertheless, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives did pass a number of 
reform measures—as with the BWA, mainly focused on increasing premium revenue through 
actuarially-based pricing—with its reauthorization bill in November 2017, against stiff 
resistance from both parties. The Senate’s proposed reforms differ substantially from those 
of the House, and, as of the time of writing, the prospect for any sweeping reform of the NFIP 
was dim. As it stands, the US has, in effect, returned to the system of ad hoc disaster relief 
that prevailed prior to the establishment of the NFIP, and which the program’s proponents 
explicitly sought to overcome.3
E. Risk Perception & Incentives Under the NFIP
It is clear from Section II.A that addressing the risk of natural hazards—in particular, 
flooding and severe storms—should be one of the foremost policy imperatives of cities. 
Yet some have argued the existing public policy only makes the task more difficult: “...the 
trend in increasing numbers and severity of disasters are the wholly predictable (in fact, 
predicted) outcomes of well-intentioned but short-sighted public policy decisions at all levels 
of government” (Burby op. cit.). In general, there are two approaches to managing flood and 
storm risk, which can be characterized as “risk mitigation” and “risk transfer” (Chen op. cit.). 
3 A budget proposal for the federal government negotiated and signed into law in Feb 2018 provides $90 billion in 
disaster relief funding to victims of Hurricane Harvey and other natural catastrophes of the previous year, but also cuts ap-
propriations for FEMA’s management.
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Risk mitigation involves structural methods, including, at a regional and national level, the 
construction of dams, levees, channel improvements, and other large-scale infrastructure; 
at the community level, establishing building codes and zoning ordinances, organizing flood 
warning systems, providing educational programs on flood-risk management, etc.; or, at 
a household level, investment in raising foundations, installing “hurricane windows,” etc. 
(ibid.; Doyle and Patterson op. cit.; Burby 2001; Landry and Li op. cit.). Risk transfer is, in 
essence, insurance (Chen op. cit.). Flood management strategies in the US have evolved from 
a focus on large-scale structural mitigation projects toward the non-structural community-
level mitigation methods listed above (Doyle and Patterson op. cit.; Landry and Li op. cit.), as 
well as, since the creation of the NFIP, toward facilitating a market for the transfer of risk. 
The NFIP was intended to fill a gap in the private insurance market that had persisted since 
at least the late 1920s (Moss op. cit.).
Why did the private flood insurance market fail in the first place? Insurance markets depend 
on a probability theorem called the “law of large numbers,” which holds that the average 
results of a large number of trials will tend toward their theoretical average (Daniels and 
Trebilcock 2006). For most insurance markets, this law holds. However, disaster insurance 
markets suffer from the problem of “correlation.” As Barnett (op. cit.) explains,
Losses from drought, flood, earthquake or hurricane do not occur in the same largely 
uncorrelated fashion as say, automobile accidents. Instead, when a loss occurs it is often 
widespread, affecting many people. With largely independent risks, such as automobile 
accidents, the statistical law of large numbers transforms the highly uncertain and 
potentially quite large loss risks of individuals into the reasonably predictable and modest 
loss risk of the insurance pool. To the extent that loss occurrences are correlated, the 
potential for risk pooling is reduced. Like the individual policy-holders, the insurer’s loss 
experience tends to be highly uncertain and potentially quite large.
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Given the high correlation of flood risk, the premiums charged by insurance companies to 
indemnify flood losses must be high for the market to be actuarially sound (ibid.; Abbott 
2008; Aerts et al. op. cit.). As Brody et al. (op. cit.) write, “traditionally, the process of risk 
assessment provides a framework for measuring hazard risk by focusing on the probability 
of events occurring and their expected impacts.” Ultimately, the private insurance market 
proved incapable of managing this process (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan op. cit.); 
insufficient information about risk, coupled with “the very high actuarial cost of the risk in 
areas where property owners were aware of flood risk, and the refusal of property owners 
to pay for insurance if the property had not recently experienced flooding,” (Abbott op. cit.) 
undermined the private market and necessitated government involvement.
As it was conceived, the NFIP was intended to bridge the gap between risk mitigation and 
risk transfer, by using the tools of the insurance markets to shape the incentives of individuals 
(Aerts et al. op. cit.; Burby 2006). Burby (2001) argues that higher building and insurance 
costs will make development in floodplains uneconomic, if the government requires property 
owners to purchase flood insurance; sets insurance rates such that they reflect actual flood 
damages costs; and risk can be lowered through building regulations. Yet, from the beginning, 
the design of the NFIP hampered the ability of the program to meet these three conditions. 
Kunreuther (1996), commenting on the rationale for the federal government’s intervention 
the flood insurance market, observed that “Insurance firms have experimented in the past 
with providing coverage against water damage from floods, hurricanes, and other storms, 
but have concluded that the risk was uninsurable… By design the Flood Insurance Fund 
[where all flood policy premiums are deposited and which pays all flood damage claims] is not 
actuarially sound [emphasis added].” Chen (op. cit.) further explains:
Historically, the federal approach to flood insurance rested on the goal of keeping 
premiums low enough to keep property owners and insurers within the NFIP, without 
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lowering premiums to the point of even more aggressively subsidizing high-risk behavior. 
In prescribing guidelines for NFIP premium rates, Congress was willing to accept rates 
that were either “adequate, on the basis of accepted actuarial principles, to provide 
reserves for anticipated losses” or—in the case of rates “less than such” an actuarially 
sound amount—“consistent with the objective of making flood insurance available where 
necessary at reasonable rates so as to encourage prospective insureds to purchase such 
insurance” [emphasis original].
Observers of the NFIP have been aware of this problem since the program’s inception. Siffin 
(1981) addresses the importance of political economy, mentioned above: “Nominally, [FEMA] 
has discretion over its premiums. In reality, it is politically blocked from using those premiums 
to deter settlement. It cannot appeal to the principle of actuarial soundness because it was 
created to cover untenable risk [emphasis added].” Writing two decades later, Barnhizer (2003) 
reached the same conclusion: “...NFIP rates are established by a political and administrative 
process subject to influence not by market forces—which would tend to eliminate actuarially 
unsound rates—but by political forces and special interests.” Furthermore, “The actual 
administration of the NFIP compounded the inefficiencies of the program’s pricing policies. 
FEMA has conspicuously set flood insurance rates on a nationwide basis. This practice defeats 
any hope that premiums might reflect regional, local, and individualized ‘topographic factors 
that are relevant to flood risk’” (Chen op. cit.). As Anderson (2000) succinctly put it, “You can 
manipulate any system, but it is much easier to manipulate a public insurance system than 
a private insurance system.” All of these conditions are reflected in the controversy over the 
BWA discussed above.
This inherent flaw in the system is so apparent and politically intractable that Burby (2006) 
hypothesized a “safe development paradox”: “…in trying to make hazardous areas safe for 
development, government policies have made them targets for catastrophes… [leading] to 
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a never-ending cycle of ever more unsafe urban development and ever larger, ever more 
catastrophic losses from natural hazards.” This is not just a symptom of risk transfer, but 
also of government-sponsored risk mitigation efforts more broadly. In the aftermath of 
Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Congress appropriated funding for the raising of existing levees 
and the construction of new levees 
…along much of the southern shore of [Lake Pontchartrain]. These levees would help 
prevent a recurrence of the losses experienced from Hurricane Betsy, and, more important, 
they would facilitate continued urbanization of this very hazardous region. In fact, 
protection of existing development accounted for only 21% of the [projected benefits of the 
new measures]. An extraordinary 79% were to come from new development that would now 
be feasible with the added protection provided by the improved levee system [emphasis 
original] (ibid.).
In practice, flood-mitigation projects and, subsequently, federally-subsidized flood insurance
…had their intended effect in easing development of hazardous areas in Jefferson and 
Orleans parishes. During the decade after Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain 
hurricane protection project and launched the NFIP, Jefferson Parish added forty-seven 
thousand housing units and Orleans Parish added twenty-nine thousand… Although 
Hurricane Betsy revealed the potential for widespread flooding of the low-lying areas 
of both parishes, the… availability of flood insurance evidently persuaded thousands of 
households that the region was reasonably safe [emphasis original] (ibid.).
In short, “These flaws in the design of the NFIP compounded the unintended effect of risk 
management for flood-prone regions: although measures such as the construction of levees 
may reduce the probability of flooding, those steps invite further settlement in floodplains 
and thereby increase the magnitude of losses incurred during floods” (Chen op. cit.).
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F. Flood Rate Insurance Maps
How did these perverse incentives come about? To fully understand why the US flood 
insurance fails the test of “actuarial soundness,” it is necessary to understand how FEMA, the 
agency responsible for overseeing the NFIP, sets insurance premiums in the first place. “The 
first step in the process of flood risk assessment is the translation of occurrence probabilities 
into the development of hazard maps [the Flood Insurance Rate Maps, or FIRMS] delineating 
areas most at risk from inundation” (Brody et al. 2013). FIRMs are developed from complex 
hydrological models produced by FEMA, and are used to set insurance premium schedules 
(Landry and Li op. cit.). The FIRMs have a significant impact on patterns of development 
through the US: “The floodplain has been the longstanding metric for determining and acting 
upon the possibility of an area being inundated in the United States. This spatial delineation 
guides local planning and development decisions, triggers insurance purchases and other 
household adjustments, and serves as the fundamental indicator for whether it is safe to 
build a structure on a particular site” (Brody op. cit.).
One major flaw of this approach is how it influences the decisions of individuals at the 
margins of FEMA’s 100-year floodplain boundary: despite the methodological constraints 
on delineating this boundary with perfect accuracy, its existence nevertheless translates 
decisions about where and how to develop, and whether or not to buy flood insurance, into 
“dichotomous choices” (ibid.):
That is, households and developments are treated equally whether they are 1 foot or 1 mile 
outside of the designated floodplain… Properties 1-foot outside the floodplain boundary are 
not required to purchase federal insurance, even though the probability of being flooded 
is only slightly lower than for those structures located 1-foot inside that boundary… 
The present use of the 100-year floodplain as a strict boundary for triggering household 
adjustment conveys a false impression of safety to those outside the delineation (ibid.).
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Doyle and Patterson (op. cit.) confirm this finding, faulting the theoretical merits of the FIRMs 
approach: “FIRMS depict the 100-year boundary as being well-defined, yet the process of 
delineating the 100-year floodplain boundary is irreducibly complex and has uncertainty due 
to limited and low-resolution data, the stochastic nature of floods, and epistemic errors in 
model assumptions.” Moreover, the authors add that “…FIRMs are updated once every 10 to 
20 years at the county level… the extent of the 100-year floodplain [based on changes in climate 
and topography] can change faster than FIRMs are updated” (ibid.) FIRMs cannot keep pace 
with development, as changes in land cover upstream of floodplain boundaries occurs faster 
than the boundaries are updated (Brody op. cit.). The impact of the floodplain methodology 
on the incentives of individual homebuyers and builders is stark: “…approximately 25% 
of flood insurance claims from 1999 to 2009 were located outside the 100-year floodplain. 
This percentage greatly increases for coastal jurisdictions… where floodplain variability is 
especially responsive to human and natural changes [to] the landscape” (ibid.). One previous 
study of repetitive loss claims in Harris County, Texas, recorded 9,521 such claims on 2,896 
properties between 1978 and 2008, totaling $351 million in damages—an average of 3.23 
claims per property and $36,881 in losses per claim (ibid.). The study’s author found that fully 
47% of all the claims were located outside of the 100-year floodplain boundary designated by 
FEMA, and the ratio holds true even after flood maps were updated in 2007 (ibid.).
The suggestion that floodplain maps do not fully take account of how development affects 
the conditions that the maps are designed to measure is crucial. The severity of flood damage 
in urbanized areas depends not primarily on the volume of water, but on what is called its 
“flow rate.” This is the speed and power that water accumulates as it moves from high to 
low elevation. Flow rates are much greater over hard or impervious surfaces, and they are 
greater along linear, grid-like channels. If water cannot run off or be absorbed into the soil, 
the flow rate grows with each passing yard. This is why so much of floodplain management 
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concerns directing and slowing the flow of water. FIRMs, of course, take into account flow 
rates. However, once the FIRM is drawn and 100-year floodplain boundary is delineated, 
conditions change quickly. The building of structures and laying of pavement redirects 
natural channels. In addition, urbanization exacerbates three effects not considered in 
FIRMs: ponding in construction sites or roadside ditches, overflow from storm sewers, and 
sheet flow.1 Any development immediately outside the FIRM’s boundary changes the flood-
model mechanics on which the map was based. Therefore, it can be said that as soon as the 
FIRM is drawn, it is already on the path to obsolescence (Kondolf and Ludy 2012). As FEMA 
itself acknowledges:
FIRMs represent a snapshot in time and therefore do not include the impacts of future 
conditions, such as long-term erosion, sea level change/sea level rise, changes in 
precipitation patterns, or changes in land use and development. Many of these changes 
could mean that the actual flood risk is great than the risk shown on the FIRM [emphasis 
added].2
Despite these shortcomings, FIRMs have significant influence on individuals’ perception 
of risk. Numerous investigations have shown that the concept of the 100-year floodplain is 
widely misunderstood, conveying the impression to homeowners—especially those that have 
experienced severe flooding—that another flood will not occur for at least ninety-nine years 
(ibid.; Mount 1995). For the reasons discussed above, residents just outside the boundaries 
of a 100-year floodplain are not required to purchase flood insurance, nor are they required 
to undertake structural mitigation efforts (Kondolf and Ludy op. cit.; Montz and Tobin 2008). 
One unintended consequence of this is that it may lead to more intensive development of 
lands close to official floodplains than would otherwise be the case (Kondolf and Ludy op. cit.; 
Burby op. cit.). This is analogous to the effect of large-scale structural mitigation projects, 
1 Sheet flow is the downslope movement of water overland in a thin, continuous film that does not concentrate into 
channels.
2 FEMA, “Coastal Flood Risk Mapping Process” (www.fema.gov).
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such as levees: a levee may be built to the elevation of a 100-year flood, but will not protect 
against the risk of a flood even marginally more severe (a “101-year” flood, so to speak), or 
against the “residual” statistical risk of a flood not occurring in a given year. Over the life of 
a 30-year mortgage, this residual risk equals 26% (Kondolf and Ludy op. cit.; Carter 2005).
Given the central importance of the FIRMs to a vast bureaucratic system—one that manages 
over five million insurance policies with a notional value of $1.274 trillion3—it is worth briefly 
discussing the process by which they are created. Once a community elects to join the NFIP, 
a FEMA consultant gathers data on land use, infrastructure, hydrology, and hydraulics4 from 
3 FEMA, as of December 31st, 2017.
4 Man-made hydrological works including canals, pipes, channels, dams, etc.
Zone Description SFHA NFIPCoverage FMRs
Low-to-Moderate Risk Areas
X
Area located outside the 500-




Area located between the 500-
year and 100-year floodplain 






Coastal area within 100-year 
floodplain boundary; annual 





Non-coastal area within 100-
year floodplain boundary; 




Area not mapped by 
FEMA; annual flood risk is 
undetermined
No N/A N/A
Table B: Simplified flood zone classification system. (Note: older FIRMs utilized a number-based 
classification system [1-30], while newer FIRMs utilize letters, with the “E” suffix indicating that the 
maps provide BFEs for the zone. Source: FEMA.
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state and local bodies, and undertakes comprehensive surveys of the local topography. Since 
the early 2000s, in certain areas, FEMA has also used satellite imagery and photographs 
taken from low-flying planes to obtain additional topographical data. This snapshot of the 
community’s physical condition is combined with historical data on past flooding events, as 
well as readings from United States Geological Survey (USGS) stream gauges (if available), 
and processed by mapping software to produce a digital model of the local floodplain. A draft 
FIRM is issued, which is subjected to local review—and, in many cases, a public comment 
period that may include presentations by FEMA experts on flood risk and mitigation. After 
these consultations, a final FIRM is issued and a flood insurance rate schedule is set for 
each of the various zones depicted on the map. Within certain zones, purchase of NFIP 
coverage is mandated and local planning boards and building departments are required to 
adopt and enforce FEMA-approved floodplain management requirements (FMRs), a set of 
regulations concerning building methods and materials to mitigate flood losses (see Table 
B, previous page). This entire process can take between three and five years,1 during which 
time conditions continue to evolve. Consequently, there are several processes by which the 
FIRMs may be updated or altered, which can be classified into two broad categories: letters 
of map revision (LOMRs) and letters of map amendment (LOMAs). LOMRs are generally 
requested by communities that have constructed physical flood mitigation infrastructure, 
such as levies, dams, catchment basins, etc. LOMAs are usually related to single properties 
disputing their inadvertent placement within the SFHAs, or by development projects that 
have taken specific steps to mitigate their flood exposure, such as raising slabs above the 
BFEs or incorporating pervious surfaces.2 Both categories of FIRM changes are usually 
adjudicated by FEMA. Whether a developer chooses to pursue a LOMA is dependent on 
1 FEMA.
2 It should be noted that development activity may also be grounds for a specific type of LOMR, called a letter of map 
revision “based on fill” (LOMR-F). The natural leveling of development sites using fill dirt that occurs during construction 
changes the topography of floodplains, and thus the mechanics on which the FIRMs are based. If there is substantial fill out-





The foregoing discussion focused on the processes and the theoretical basis for the flood 
insurance system of the US—particularly, the creation and dissemination of FIRMs—and 
the observed outcomes of this system over its fifty-year history. What is largely lacking 
from the wide-ranging critiques of the NFIP is an empirical, spatiotemporal analysis of the 
incentive effects described above. This is most likely because, as many researchers in this field 
acknowledge, the demand for new housing is best understood as a “hedonic” phenomenon, 
meaning that it is the result of multiple interdependent factors, many of which are difficult 
to quantify. In the present context, the incentives created by the delineation of a 100-year 
flood-plain are not the only factor that determines the location and character of real estate 
development. 
Nevertheless, the central argument of this paper is that the effects of most other contributing 
factors to this determination can be controlled by focusing on the immediate periphery of 
floodplains, specifically, the space between the 100-year and 500-year floodplains, referred to 
as the “marginal 100-year floodplain.” Federal flood insurance requirements and advanced 
mitigation measures, as mentioned, apply within the 100-year floodplain (the SFHA, 
analysis of the short-term costs of complying with LOMA guidelines versus the long-term 
benefits of not being located inside the SFHA. This economic consideration lies at the heart 
of the system of incentives that links FIRMs to the supply of real estate development.
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discussed above), but not in the marginal floodplain. In this marginal zone, in most cases, 
there should be little variation in other hedonic conditions on either side of the base flood 
boundary, meaning that real estate developers would respond to the financial incentives 
of lower construction costs—as well as the advantage that buyers and tenants will not be 
required to purchase flood insurance—attendant with choosing to build outside the boundary. 
Yet, as discussed, the dichotomous nature of these boundaries belies the very fine gradation 
of actual flood hazard: there is little difference, actuarially speaking, between the probability 
of flooding inside the 100-year floodplain and inside the marginal plain. The certainty created 
by this boundary conflicts with the stochastic nature of flooding (Brody et al. op. cit.; Doyle 
and Patterson op. cit.). This is especially true in flatter terrain: the most important FIRM 
element, the BFE1, is merely a contour line and, in cases where the slope gradient is low, the 
differential in elevation on either side of the BFE is also low. Simply put, a development site 
with an elevation one foot higher than the BFE is technically outside the floodplain. Though 
there may be little difference in flood hazard, there would be a significant difference in the 
costs of both constructing and maintaining the structures built. Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
it can be supposed that reduced costs are among the principal drivers of these development 
decisions.
It is possible, using geocoded data,2 to perform spatiotemporal analysis of these “edge 
effects” of floodplain boundaries. Yet, as mentioned, the few examples in the literature with 
an empirical focus tend to be ethnographic in nature: e.g., surveys of risk perception, disaster 
experiences, etc. One attempt to address this lacuna was made by Doyle and Patterson (op. 
cit.); the methodology of this important paper influenced the analytical approach to the case 
study in Section IV, below, and therefore warrants further discussion.
1 As discussed in Section II.D, above, the BFE is used to determine the SFHA, i.e., the 100-year floodplain: the 100-
year flood is considered a “base flood.”




A. The Risk-Exposure Model
Building off the work of Bana e Costa et al. (2004), Doyle and Patterson developed a 
method of quantifying the “socioeconomic exposure” of communities to flood risk, with the 
purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of a 1994 federal policy intended to dis-incentivize the 
development and occupation of areas within the 100-year floodplain. As the authors note, “…
no consistent monitoring has been undertaken to examine the unintentional effect of national 
flood policy on development adjacent to the 100-year floodplain, which could be located inside 
the 100-year floodplain as land use and climate change alter the flood regime” (Doyle and 
Patterson op. cit.). Such development patterns adjacent to floodplains—and the incentives 
that drive them—are the central focus of this thesis. Doyle and Patterson’s approach, dubbed 
the “Temporal Flood Loss Exposure Model” (T-FLEM), relies on national population and 
real estate tax assessment data to establish a single, standardized metric of risk, which the 
authors define as:
Risk=Hazard x Exposure
where “hazard” is the probability that a flood will occur and “exposure” measures the loss 
potential in terms of people (mortality) and economic value (property damage). Observing how 
this risk metric changes, spatially and over time, can provide an indication of the success or 
failure of FIRMs as tools of mitigating flood losses. In the context of the theoretical discussion 
in the preceding section, are the cost structures imposed by FIRMs serving as efficient price 
signals, or are they merely encouraging risky development along the perimeter of the SFHA? 
The metric developed by Doyle and Patterson is intended to help answer that question.
The building blocks of the T-FLEM model, and of the spatial analysis in the next section, 
are as follows. First, since the main focus of the study is the effect of the 100-year and 500-
year floodplain boundaries, as delineated by FEMA, the corresponding statutory probability 
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of each class of flood (1% and 0.2% respectively, in a given year) are used as the hazard 
measure. One glaring problem with this definition of flooding hazard is that, evidently, 
severe floods occur much more frequently than these probabilities suggest: as the case study 
(below) will describe, the central Gulf Coast region of Texas has experienced three “500-
year” flood events in as many years. Yet, the purpose of this definition is not yet to rate the 
actuarial soundness of FEMA’s base flood methodology, but rather to show that, even if the 
probabilities are accurate, the observed risk metric may still increase because the other half 
of the equation, exposure, has increased. In other words, using FEMA’s definition of flood 
hazard allows the hazard variable to be held constant across space and time. The hypothesis 
of the Doyle and Patterson paper, and of this thesis, is that the delineation of the boundary 
creates an incentive to build within the marginal 100-year floodplain, thereby increasing 
exposure and risk. Thus, the purpose of the T-FLEM model is really to measure the exposure 
variable: has a community placed more people and property in harm’s way, for a given level 
of hazard, and, crucially, why?
Doyle and Patterson divide their measure of exposure into two categories, mentioned 
above: a “social” element (population of the marginal floodplain) and an “economic” element 
(quantity and density of housing and other structures). To quantify these variables, the 
authors rely on data from the US Census Bureau and local real estate tax assessments.1 
The main challenge with these data is the geographic level of aggregation. The smallest 
geographic unit for decennial census data2 is the “census block,” and for annual ACS data, the 
“block group.” In highly urbanized areas, these blocks typically correspond to actual physical 
city blocks. In less dense areas of suburban sprawl, with greater distances between roads 
and lacking a rectilinear grid, these blocks are bounded by geographic features that do not 
1 In the US, improvements are generally assessed at different tax rates than land, allowing assessment data to serve 
as proxies for development.
2 Also referred to as “100% data,” these datasets are based on mandatory surveys of all US households, rather than 
the statistical sampling of the annual “American Community Survey” (ACS).
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necessarily correspond to elements of the urban fabric. As Doyle and Patterson point out, 
data aggregated at these levels are represented in GIS-based software as “discrete vector 
polygons,” which creates “uncertainty in how the population or building tax value is spatially 
distributed” within the polygon (ibid.). This makes it difficult to discern spatiotemporal 
change in the underlying data where these polygons intersect floodplains (see Figure 5). The 
authors describe two potential solutions to this problem, building off the work of Bhaduri et 
al. (2007). The first assumes that the studied variables, in this case population and building 
Figure 5: A comparison of US Census block groups in Cypress, TX (outlined in light blue) and FIRM-
based floodplain boundaries illustrates the difficulty of using vector polygons to assess changes in flood 
exposure. Block group 544402.1 (outlined in dark blue) is a case in point: much of the block group is 
contained within FEMA-designated floodplains, and there has clearly been development both within 
and without these floodplains. However, spatiotemporal data that might describe the pattern of this 
development is aggregated at the block group level and represented as uniform across the polygon. 
Finer-grained, rasterized data on the change in land use over time are required (Doyle and Patterson 
2009). Source: US Census Bureau, FEMA, ESRI.
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tax values, are uniformly distributed throughout the subject GIS polygon, such as a block 
or census tract. It then weights the variables depending on the proportion of that polygon 
that is in or out of the floodplain. In other words, “if 25% of the area of the census block is 
located inside the floodplain, then 25% of the population [or assessed real estate value] in 
that census block is assumed to be inside the floodplain” (Doyle and Patterson op. cit.). The 
other approach relies on the “centroid” of the polygon: if the centroid of the census block is 
inside the floodplain, then 100% of the population and assessed value are assumed to be 
inside the floodplain.
The problems with both solutions are obvious, and lead to persistent under- or overweighting 
of the population and assessed real estate values within or without the marginal floodplain, 
and thus of the severity of exposure to flood risk. The T-FLEM model addresses these problems 
by a third approach: normalizing socioeconomic data using the National Land Cover Dataset 
(NLCD). The NLCD is produced by the Land Cover Institute of the USGS, which analyses 
high-resolution satellite imagery to create a rasterized1 spatial representation of twenty-
one classifications of land use, ranging from forests, deserts, and wetlands to four distinct 
categories of development, based on density levels. The NLCD affords a more accurate 
picture of spatiotemporal changes in development intensity on the periphery of the 100-year 
floodplain. This paper, confining its attention to a smaller geographic area than that studied 
by Doyle and Patterson, attempts to apply their loss model at an even finer grain of detail, 
using tax assessment data tied to actual real estate parcels. This should resolve the vector 
problems described above, since it is no longer necessary to parse out the spatial distribution of 
population or real estate value across a too-large geographic. Since flood damage assessments 
are also geocoded to specific parcels, this makes it possible to study spatiotemporal changes 
along the periphery of floodplains with great precision.
1 Whereas vector data relies on lines (“vectors”) and polygons, raster data is represented by pixels at varying resolu-
tions, which creates a “smooth” surface that more accurately depicts their underlying spatial characteristics.
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B. Data & GIS Sources
There are three broad categories of data upon which the spatiotemporal analysis in Section 
V is based: geospatial boundaries of floodplains, as depicted in official FIRMs; appraisal 
values of real estate tax parcels; and geocoded flood damage assessments. The first category—
which, as mentioned, represents the “hazard” portion of the risk equation—were obtained 
from FEMA and the Harris County Flood Control District (HCFCD), both of which publish 
digital map layers compatible with ArcGIS’s ArcMap 10.5.1 software. FEMA’s comprehensive 
National Flood Hazard Layer (NFHL) covers the entire US, depicting the most recent 
statutory boundaries of the various flood zones. HCFCD provides geocoded records of LOMAs 
and LOMRs within each flood zone.
Real estate appraisal data at the parcel-level were obtained from the Harris County 
Appraisal District (HCAD), the tax assessor for the greater Houston area. HCAD undertakes 
appraisals of all of Harris County’s approximately 1.4 million individual tax parcels every 
January, and certifies these values in mid-August. Therefore, the most recent certified values 
are dated August 2017, and historical values are available dating back to August 2005. 
Changes in the appraised value of the parcels are taken as changes in the “exposure” half of 
the risk equation. It should be noted that appraised values do not necessarily equal market 
values. However, where developable land is abundant and cheap, appraised value tends to 
track market value more closely. In addition, fortunately HCAD’s assessments divide the 
total appraised value into constituent values, including land value, improvement value, 
and the value of new construction for each parcel. The analysis below will focus primarily 
on changes in the appraised value of improvements and new construction in the marginal 
floodplain, relative to the 100-year floodplain and to non-hazardous areas, as a proxy for 
incentive-driven investment decisions in each zone.
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In all cases, HCAD data were filtered to obtain parcels corresponding to real, not personal, 
property.1 The parcel boundaries, of course, change over time, as they are either combined or, 
more commonly, subdivided for new development. Historical parcel boundaries are available 
dating back to 2013; from 2005-13, appraisal data are aggregated to the parcel boundaries 
that existed prior to any subdivision. To determine within which flood zone a given parcel is 
located, the centroid method is utilized, on the assumption that the housing unit occupying 
that parcel is situated roughly above the parcel’s centroid. This assumption, of course, does 
not always hold (although for certain types of real estate, such as condominiums, it functions 
quite well), but the problems of over- or underweighting exposure described above should 
be ameliorated given the very fine gradation of geographic detail and across the very large 
sample size of the parcel data.2
The final category of data, FEMA and HCFCD damage assessments, are geocoded by the 
same unique address identifier of each tax parcel, enabling a direct comparison of the parcel’s 
statutory versus its actual flood risk. It should be noted that the assessments are based 
on models of a flood’s high-water line, and do not reflect actual NFIP damage claims. The 
assessments are preferred for two reasons: first, NFIP claims data may not accurately reflect 
the actual extent of flood damage, since (as discussed below), so many houses do not carry 
NFIP coverage, and also because the NFIP does not, for privacy reasons, release parcel-level 
data on damage claims. Using the datasets described above, the following two sections will 
undertake spatiotemporal analysis of development patterns along the margins of FEMA-
designated floodplains in Harris County, Texas, which contains the city of Houston and its 
suburbs.
1 New multi-family or condominium units are shown as distinct, adjacent parcels, rather as if they were small town-
houses, to address the problem of spatially representing vertical versus horizontal development.
2 To make this determination in actual practice, FEMA relies on surveys of the elevation of the lowest point of each 
structure’s foundation slab, in relation to the BFE. However, the author is not aware of any datasets that contain spatial 
representations of the actual structural footprints for each parcel.
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IV. CASE STUDY: HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
Harris County was chosen as a case study of the incentive effects of FIRMs for three 
reasons. The first is population growth: between 2000 and 2016, Harris was the fastest 
growing county in the US, adding 1,033,679 residents and almost doubling in size over the 
period;3 if these newcomers had formed their own city, it would be more populous than San 
Jose, California. As of 2017, Houston was the fourth-most-populous urban agglomeration 
in the US, and it is growing almost thirty-times faster on annualized basis than the third-
most-populous, Chicago.4 The drivers of this growth are legion, but the most critical factors 
are the economy and the relatively low cost of housing. As the US economy emerged from 
recession in mid-to-late 2009, Houston experienced some of the fastest job growth in the 
country, with employment rolls rising at an annualized rate of 3.6% in the four years to 
2013.5 The city’s economy, dominated by the energy sector, grew at an annualized rate of 
7.1% over the same period.6 The sharp decline in crude oil prices, which began in September 
2014, caused Houston’s economy to contract in 2015-6 (though growth returned in 2017), but 
did not have a lasting impact on net migration figures for Harris County.7 This is probably 
accounted for by the second growth factor mentioned above: inexpensive housing, the result 
of abundant land for development and a relatively lax regulatory environment. An entire 
crop of graduate theses could be devoted to the causes and consequences of Houston’s lack 
of coordinated planning, and to the resulting suburban sprawl that has become, for most 
observers, the defining characteristic of the city’s physical fabric. For the present purposes, it 
will suffice to note that Houston’s urbanized area exceeds 627 mi², one-third larger than New 
York City (with one-quarter the population), almost three times the size of Chicago, and 25% 
3 US Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 5-Year Estimates, (2012-6); retrieved Feb 2018.
4 Ibid.
5 US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Metropolitan Statistical Area Labor Force Statistics; retrieved Feb 2018.
6 US Bureau of Economic Analysis; retrieved Feb 2018.
7 According to Census, BLS, and BEA data.
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larger than even that most famous of automobile-dependent urban expanses, Los Angeles.1
This model of urban development pursued in Houston and its environs is the second reason 
that Harris County is a valuable case study for this thesis. With virtually no limitations on 
the quantity or character of development projects in the county, financial incentives play an 
especially strong role in shaping the urban fabric. Though FEMA, the HCFCD, and other 
agencies do impose construction and flood mitigation guidelines, and require the purchase 
of flood insurance within SFHAs, the lack of central planning capacity integrated with a 
preventive flood management system limits the impact of these measures on physical 
1 This helps explain the phenomenon discussed in Section II.A, above: the low-density character of development 
typified by Houston and the urban centers of many other CSCs, particularly along the Gulf Coast, has prevented population 
density from keeping pace with the surge in overall population numbers.




outcomes in the region, as will be discussed in section IV.B, below. The final condition that 
makes Harris County such an illustrative example of the themes discussed in this paper is its 
vulnerability to flooding: from January 1978 to December 2017, Harris County policyholders 
submitted more NFIP claims and received more dollar payouts from the program than any 
other county in the US.2 This dubious distinction became a focus of national attention in the 
late summer of 2017.
A. Hurricane Harvey
At 10:00 PM CDT, on August 25th, 2017, Hurricane Harvey made landfall in the US, coming 
ashore in southeast Texas, near the town of Rockport. Over the next several hours, with 
windspeeds reaching 130 miles per hour, Harvey swirled some 180 miles up the Gulf Coast 
of Texas, toward the Houston metropolitan area.3 The cyclone then stalled for approximately 
two days, blocked from moving northward by a high-pressure system from the northwest. 
Before heading back out to the Gulf of Mexico over August 28th-29th, Harvey dropped over 27 
trillion gallons of water on the city of Houston and its surroundings; the total rainfall of fifty-
two inches was the highest ever recorded in the continental US (Dottle et al. 2017). Nearly one 
in seven Houston residents (over 300,000 people) were left without power. Thirty thousand 
people were displaced by the flooding, and as many as eighty-nine were killed. Though the 
casualty figures were substantially lower than those from Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 
economic toll (which is still being tallied at the time of writing), was far greater. Whereas 
Katrina left approximately $160 billion of damage in its wake, preliminary estimates suggest 
the full cost of Harvey will be well over $200 billion (ibid.). The Texas Department of Public 
Safety estimated that more than 185,000 homes were damaged throughout the state, with 
2 FEMA, NFIP Policy & Claim Statistics (Dec 2017); retrieved Feb 2018. Together, Harris County and Jefferson and 
Orleans Parishes in Louisiana, account for fully 27.7% of all payouts under the NFIP since Jan 1978, a total of more than 
$18.3 billion.
3 Statistics in this subsection are derived from National Weather Service (NWS) reports and statements of federal, 
state, and municipal authorities, as reported in local and national media.
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9,000 completely destroyed and a further 17,000 that will likely be razed as a result of the 
damage sustained. Given that the median home price in the Houston area is approximately 
$325,0001, this means that up to $8.5 billion of housing value in the city—equal to 19% of all 
new construction activity in the state of Texas in 20162—was eliminated in forty-eight hours.
The pertinent question for this paper is how much of that building activity occurred within 
or adjacent to 100-year floodplains? According to a study conducted by Hui et al. (2017), using 
live satellite imagery of the inundation during Hurricane Harvey, about 32.3% of damage 
occurred within FEMA’s 100-year flood boundaries. 13.4% occurred within the marginal 500-
year flood-plain (i.e., just outside the boundaries of the 100-year floodplain), and fully 53.4% 
of the damage occurred in areas rated “Minimal Flood Hazard,” which are not mapped by 
FEMA at all (ibid.). Though Harris County adopted updated FIRMs in January 20173 (see 
Figure 7, facing page), the previous maps were adopted in June 2007, and the city’s floodplain 
management protocols were based on the older FIRMs when Harvey struck (Koerth-Baker 
2017). Much of the input data for the 2007 FIRMs were insufficiently robust: in Harris County, 
fourteen of the thirty-four “stream gauges”—devices utilized by the USGS to measure flow 
rates in riverine systems and watersheds—have been in place for less than twenty years, 
and only seven have been recording data for more than sixty years (ibid.). This means that 
the majority of Harris County’s stream gauge data, which helps determine the boundaries of 
the 100-year flood zone, is less than sixty years old. By one estimate, in October 2017, of the 
thirty-nine Texas counties that experienced flooding during Hurricane Harvey, only seven 
had FIRMs based on precipitation data obtained later than 2001 (Handy 2017).
According to public records, more than 360,000 permits for new construction were issued in 
Harris County between 2000 and 2015 (Morris and Zaveri 2016). Developers would be obliged 
to show how larger projects would affect the HCFCD and FEMA’s flooding models, based on 
1 According to data obtained from Zillow.
2 According to surveys conducted by the Commercial Real Estate Association (2017).
3 See further discussion in the next subsection.
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the FIRMs presently in force (ibid.). In other words, the developer of a housing subdivision 
or retail strip in 2015 would only have to demonstrate that the plan did not adversely affect 
floodplain management in 2007, not 2015, as if changes in the built environment over the 
previous eight years had not occurred. These perverse incentives also effect the choice of 
whether or not to carry flood insurance. As of June 2017, there were 249,212 NFIP policies 
held by Harris County residents, a decline of around 16.7% since 2008 (Hui et al. op. cit.)—
despite the fact that at least three “500-year” floods have occurred in the Houston area over 
Figure 7: Harris County flood zones as of January 2017, based on comprehensive FIRMs adopted in 
June 2007. Studies undertaken in 2015-7 resulted in revisions to specific FIRM panels, showin in dark 
green hatch Property-level assessments of flood damage resulting from Hurricane Harvey, prepared 
by FEMA and HCFCD, are shown in dark blue. A quick glance at the map suggests the extent of flood-
ing that occurred outside of FEMA-designated hazard areas. Source: FEMA, HCFCD, ESRI.
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the same time period, seemingly countering the assertions about flood occurrence and risk 
perceptions discussed in the literature (cf. Kondolf and Ludy op. cit.).1 On the $70.34 billion 
notional value of assets that these policies covered in Harris County, the Flood Insurance 
Fund collects annual premiums of $134.4 million (ibid.), implying a premium rate of 0.19%.2 
This is plainly not enough to cover the magnitude of realized losses in the region. Indeed, it 
is a clear incentive to risky behavior, as evidenced by the preponderance of SRLPs in Harris 
County. Of the approximately 30,000 US properties so designated by FEMA, 4,889 are in 
Texas, 2,794 are in Harris County, and 1,925 are within Houston’s city limits (ibid.). The 
NFIP has paid out nearly $196 million on SRLPs in Harris County, the most of any county 
in the US (ibid.). Hui et al. (op. cit.) identified the thirty individual SLRPs with the highest 
ratio of insurance claim payouts to market value across the US; nine are in the Houston 
metropolitan area.
B. Flooding & Mitigation in Harris County
The conditions exposed by Hurricane Harvey shocked much of the US public, but they 
have been decades—even millennia—in the making. In contrast to the arid and semi-arid 
plains, brush country, and grassy savanna that predominate in Texas’s interior, the state’s 
Gulf Coast, including most of Harris County, is part of a humid wetlands ecosystem that 
stretches into the southwestern Louisiana marshlands. This low-lying region—much of it, 
including the eastern stretches of urban Houston, not more than thirty feet above sea level—
is drained, as in coastal Louisiana, by a network of slow-moving bayous that braid through 
legacy prairies, oak mottes, and salt-grass marshes into tidal estuaries along the Gulf of 
1 The lack of insurance policy penetration might seem to undermine the argument that low insurance rates act as an 
incentive to homebuyers; however, it can be assumed that not having to purchase insurance at all, particularly when advised 
that a home is outside FEMA floodzones, is more attractive than paying even low, subsidized rates.
2 This number is intriguing, because it is about equal to the actuarial probability of a 500-year flood occurring in a 
given year (0.20%). Thus, the NFIP’s insurance rate structure implies that all of Harris County is effectively in a 500-year 
floodplain, with a 0.20% probability of such a catastrophe of occurring. Recent experience suggests that the likelihood is closer 
to one in three.
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Mexico.3 The principal bayou of Harris County is Buffalo Bayou, flowing from Katy, Texas, 
fifty-three miles east to meet the San Jacinto River just north of Galveston Bay. The Buffalo 
Bayou watershed drains nearly five hundred square miles, or 28% of Harris County’s land 
area4 (see Figure 8). Annual rainfall in the region is between thirty and fifty inches per 
year—and more than fifty-five inches in Harris County—versus fifteen to thirty inches for 
the rest of the state.5 The wet climate and soils consisting of acidic, sandy loams fostered the 
cultivation of sugar cane, cotton, and, toward the end of the 19th century, rice.
3 Texas Parks & Wildlife, Texas Ecoregions; retrieved Feb 2018.
4 Information concerning Buffalo Bayou and its tributaries was obtained from the HCFCD.
5 Texas Parks & Wildlife, op. cit., and Texas Almanac (2018-9).
Figure 8: Harris County hydrological system, indicating the location of major bayous and streams, 
as well as tributary drainage channels, with an overlay (light blue) of the Buffalo Bayou-San Jacinto 




As a consequence of its ecology, topography, and climate, Harris County has a long history 
of flooding. The city of Houston was founded at the confluence of Buffalo and White Oak 
Bayous by two real estate speculators from New York—the brothers Augustus and John Kirby 
Allen—in August 1836. In the following year, the new settlement’s main street flooded twice: 
after heavy spring rains in April, and after an October hurricane that caused Buffalo Bayou 
to rise four feet.1 Undeterred, Houston continued to grow and prosper. Texas’s accession to 
the US in December 1845 was a boon to the local economy, as Houston became a hub for the 
region’s cotton exports, brought in by rail and shipped out of the nearby Port of Galveston. 
The floods, however, did not abate. By one estimate, there were eighteen major floods in the 
city’s first seven decades, or about once every three or four years.2 Many (though by no means 
all) of these floods were linked to major storms on the Gulf. The worst storm of the era—and 
to date the deadliest natural disaster in US history—was the Great Galveston Hurricane of 
September 1900, which claimed between 6,000 and 12,000 lives and devastated Galveston’s 
economy. It also had a lasting impact on Houston, as investors, looking for an alternative to 
the ruined Port of Galveston, initiated projects to expand the Port of Houston’s deep-water 
shipping capacity. In 1902, the federal government approved funds to widen and upgrade the 
Houston Ship Channel—linking the port to the Gulf of Mexico across Galveston Bay—and in 
1910, Harris County appropriated $1.25 million to dredge the channel further, to a depth of 
twenty-five feet.
The completion of the Houston Ship Channel improvements in 1914 was cause for 
celebration, but within a year, Houston residents had occasion to rue the project. In 1915, 
another severe hurricane made landfall near Galveston. That city was partially protected by 
a seawall constructed in the aftermath of the 1900 storm, while the surge was diverted into 
the newly dredged Houston Ship Channel, carrying flood waters high up Galveston Bay into 




the San Jacinto estuary and Buffalo Bayou, which broke its banks by almost fifteen inches.3 
This incident fits a long-standing pattern in Harris County’s approach to hydrological works: 
a focus on expedience and short-term economic benefit over long-term stability. When the 
region’s earliest settlers first began to convert the land to agricultural uses, their primary 
concern was drainage. This meant moving storm water away from cultivated lands as quickly 
as possible, dredging and widening the lower courses of bayous, with as little thought toward 
water retention as was given to tidal flows in Galveston Bay in the headlong rush to complete 
the ship channel.  These efforts had the effect of increasing flow rates in the eastern courses 
of Harris County’s waterways. As discussed in Section II.F, higher flow rates, coupled with 
the continued development of Houston’s urban core (see Figure 9, next page), increased the 
destructive potential of each successive flood event—an increase in both the hazard and the 
exposure elements of the risk equation.
Authorities began to consider flood control strategies in the late 1920s and 1930s, coinciding 
with increased attention at the federal level in the aftermath of the 1927 Mississippi floods 
and the passage of the Flood Control Act the following year.4 In December 1935, Houston 
experienced the worst flooding since it was founded, with Buffalo Bayou surging fifty-two 
feet and leaving in its wake $3 million ($53.6 million in 2017) in property damage (Gonzales 
2015). Spurred to action, a committee of flood management advocates—including Harris 
County officials, the Houston Chamber of Commerce, and the Buffalo Bayou Property Owners 
Association—pressed the next session of the Texas state legislature, in the spring of 1937, to 
pass a bill creating the HCFCD.5 The HCFCD’s mandate was to prevent “continued public 
calamity caused by great floods, and to construct improvements to control flood waters in 
said district…”6 As a measure of the effort’s earnestness, the legislature committed, for ten 
3 HCFCD.
4 See Section II.C, above.
5 Then, as now, Texas’s bicameral legislature meets on a biennial basis.
6 Texas House of Representatives, No. 234, Regular Session, Jan-May 1935.
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years, fully “one-half of the ad valorem taxes collected for general revenue purposes upon the 
property and from persons in Harris County”1 to the HCFCD. 
The HCFCD has primary responsibility for Harris County’s flood management efforts. Since 
FEMA took over the administration of the NFIP in 1979, the HCFCD has overseen enforcement 
of FMRs within SFHAs. As with federal regulations, Harris County’s supplemental FMRs 
apply to newly constructed or substantially improved structures. These include obtaining 
a special “floodplain development permit,” a post-construction elevation certificate from a 
1 Ibid.
Figure 9: Harris County development pattern, since 1945, by the median year built of structures 
within each US Census block group. The northwest corner of the county, which contains Cypress, 
is clearly of a recent vintage. The median year built for structures within the Cypress block groups 
(shown in dark red line) is between 2000 and 2008. Source: US Census Bureau, American Community 
Survey, 5 Year Estimates (2012-6); ESRI.
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special surveyor, specialized insurance coverage for construction sites, and submitting to 
numerous additional inspections. FMRs further stipulate grading, filling, paving, and 
building material guidelines for projects within SFHAs. In addition, the HCFCD establishes 
detention requirements—mandatory substitution of lost permeable surfaces (mainly grass) 
with slowly draining ponds and underground basins, coupled with special environmental 
impact statements (EISs) certifying that these efforts mitigate the project’s impact on FEMA’s 
flood models—which are generally more onerous on projects within the 100-year floodplain 
than on those without. Given the volume of development in Harris County within or adjacent 
to designated flood zones, supervision of FMRs is one of the HCFCD’s key functions. In 
addition, since 2010, the HCFCD has been delegated responsibility by FEMA for overseeing 
the technical review of LOMR applications.2
In its role as custodian of Harris County’s flood zones, the HCFCD has been involved in 
efforts to improve FEMA’s methodology in producing the FIRMs. These efforts took on special 
urgency in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Allison, which struck the southwestern Gulf Coast 
in June 2001. Stalling over southeastern Texas for fifteen days, the storm dropped 38.6 inches 
of rain on the Houston metropolitan area, 80% of the city’s annual average precipitation. The 
deluge claimed twenty-two lives, damaged 73,000 homes—more than 2,700 beyond repair—
and displaced more than 30,000 residents.3 Estimates of total property damage ranged as 
high as $5 billion, and Harris and thirty other Texas counties (along with forty-one counties 
in four other states) received federal disaster declarations. By all accounts, the HCFCD’s 
flood management efforts prior to 2001 (especially the construction of the Addicks and Barker 
Reservoirs, discussed below) had been largely successful, with no major inundation of central 
Houston or its outlying communities on the scale of the 1935 disaster. Yet Allison was the 
most severe flood event in Harris County since the creation of the NFIP, revealing significant 




flaws in the district’s flood control armor, notably in its FIRMs. By one estimate, 65% of the 
flood damage caused by Allison was outside any mapped floodplain.1 The HCFCD calculated 
that only 1,300 of the county’s 2,500 miles of bayous and creeks had been studied in the 
process of preparing the FIRMs.
To rectify this, the HCFCD partnered with FEMA in the Tropical Storm Allison Recovery 
Project (TSARP), which, among other goals, aimed to revamp the FIRM methodology. TSARP 
involved updating historical data on flooding patterns, which had last been gathered in the 
late 1970s-80s, to incorporate into FEMA models. Most importantly, a fleet of low-flying 
planes would employ light-detection-and-ranging (LiDAR) technology to comprehensively 
remap Harris County’s topography. These data would be knitted together with satellite 
imagery of land cover patterns produced by the USGS’s LandSat program. The result was 
a more dynamic flood model that could be deployed in a digital FIRM (D-FIRM)2, which 
enabled geospatial analysis of floodplain characteristics by policymakers and academics. 
These D-FIRMs were subsequently tested by two major “500-year” flood events3 that hit 
Harris County in May 2015 and April 2016 (the “Tax Day Floods”), but once again substantial 
flooding occurred outside the designated floodplains, leading to periodic follow-up studies and 
updates of specific FIRM panels.4
TSARP represents the soft infrastructure of the HCFCD’s flood management program. As 
mentioned above, the creation of the HCFCD dovetailed with federal efforts—overseen by the 
US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)—to build hard flood control infrastructure throughout 
the country. The most important such projects in Harris County—and the essential elements 
of the regional flood control system—are the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. The reservoirs 
were formed by two rolled earthen dams, arranged in elongated arcs and erected by the 
1 Ibid.
2 FEMA had begun to transition to D-FIRMs in certain areas of the country in the early 2000s.




USACE between 1942 and 1948. The Barker Reservoir encompasses the upper stretches of the 
Buffalo Bayou and Mason Creek watersheds, straddling the Harris-Fort Bend County line and 
draining an area of 126 square miles.5 Northeast of the Barker, the Addicks Reservoir catches 
Langham Creek and three of its main tributaries, just before they empty in Buffalo Bayou; its 
drainage area is 138 square miles. The reservoirs’ purpose is to create a catchment basin for 
rainfall as it flows southeast across Harris County, and to stabilize Buffalo Bayou’s flow in its 
lower courses, around Houston’s urban core. Combined, the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs 
have a storage capacity of 510 million cubic meters. Even these massive hydrological works, 
however, could not withstand the unprecedented rainfall of Hurricane Harvey. On August 
28th, 2017, as the water reached a record depth of 109 feet in Addicks Reservoir and began 
to swamp the northernmost section of the dam along Tanner Road, the USACE began a 
controlled release of both reservoirs, at two outlets near the confluence of Buffalo Bayou and 
Langham Creek. Water surged through the spillway at a rate of 16,000 cubic feet/second into 
Buffalo Bayou, which broke its banks. The USACE justified its decision by the argument that 
a controlled release is better than an uncontrolled breach of the berm; this rationale is now 
being challenged in at least three federal class action lawsuits brought against the USACE 
by owners of property along Buffalo Bayou, downstream of the reservoirs.
Figure 10 (next page) illustrates the outcome of the decision to release storm waters from 
the reservoirs, but it also provides a clue to the pattern of flooding that can be expected 
from extreme storms such as Harvey. As is shown in the figure, the communities east of the 
Addicks and Barker Reservoirs’ berms escaped mostly unscathed, but Harvey was merciless 
to communities north and west of the reservoirs. Flood waters followed the terrain, which 
slopes south and east toward the catchment basins, but generally did not adhere to the flood 
zone boundaries delineated in the FIRMs, except downstream of the reservoirs’ spillways, 




Figure 10: The Addicks & Barker Reservoirs during Hurricane Harvey, with FEMA-designated flood 
zone overlays. Source: FEMA, HCFCD, ESRI.
Bayou and the areas north and west of the reservoirs, which suffered the worst damage 
during the storm, were both included in studies of specific FIRM panels undertaken in 2015-
7 that resulted in the adoption of updated D-FIRMs in January 2017. Despite the recent 
vintage of the data and enhanced methodology of these maps, they still failed to predict 
the actual extent of flood damage in the study areas. This failure was repeated throughout 
Harris County, but nowhere were the shortcomings of the FIRMs more glaring than in the 
northeastern suburb of Cypress.
C. Cypress, Texas
In 1984, the Friendswood Development Company acquired 3,200 acres of land in northwest 
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Harris County from Atlanta-based Cox Enterprises.1 The parcel was bounded to the south by 
the old Hempstead Highway—soon to become an extension of the US 290 freeway running 
northwest from Houston—and to the north by the meandering Little Cypress Creek, a 
bayou shaded by willow oak and bald-cypress trees. It consisted mainly of tallgrass prairie, 
interspersed with pasture land and rice and dairy farms. The area was home to only about 
one hundred residents and had witnessed little growth over the preceding decades. Just 
thirty miles away, however, the city of Houston had begun its outward sprawl, its population 
growing nearly three-fold, from around 595,000 to almost 1.6 million, between the 1950 
and 1980 decennial censuses.2 This break-neck growth was fueled by the petrochemicals 
industry, of which Houston had been a major hub since the original Texan gusher was struck 
at Spindletop in nearby Beaumont, Texas, in 1901. Friendswood was one of the grandchildren 
of the oil boom: it was founded in 1962 as a subsidiary of the Houston-based Humble Oil 
Company to develop surface parcels acquired by its parent3 for their mineral rights. One 
year after acquiring the land on US 290, Friendswood unveiled plans to build a 5,800-home 
subdivision on the site, to be called Fairfield.
Fairfield was the harbinger. Today, there are not fewer than thirty individual subdivisions 
in what is now the unincorporated community of Cypress4 (see Figure 11, next page). These 
master-planned communities—fanning out to the north and east of US 290 in curvilinear 
whorls and loops that recall the “ticky-tacky little boxes” of the famous 1962 Malvina 
Reynolds song—are home to around 144,000 people in approximately 40,000 households.5 The 
population has grown by over 18% since 2010. By one estimate, the population of the unified 
1 According to public records.
2 US Census Bureau, Population Total (1980); retrieved Dec. 2017.
3 Humble Oil was founded in the town of Humble, in Harris County, a decade after Spindletop; it later merged with 
Esso and other brands to become the Exxon Corporation. Exxon sold Friendswood to the Miami-based developer Lennar Cor-
poration in 1995 (PR Newswire, 7 December 1995).
4 Cypress has no formal US Census designation, but is most often identified by the zip-code tabulation areas (ZCTAs) 
labeled Cypress (77410, 77429, and 77433), or by the tracts 5544-7, 5555.02, and 5557. These two areas, importantly, are not 
coterminous. The analysis in this paper utilizes a special, purpose-drawn boundary for Cypress that is consistent across all 
maps in this section.
5 Population and household income data in this subsection were obtained from US Census Bureau, American Commu-
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Figure 11: Cypress, TX, in Dec. 1989 (top) and Dec. 2017 (bottom). The first phase of the Fairfield 
development can be seen in the center left of the top panel. Source: Google Earth Pro (2018).
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school district encompassing both Cypress and the neighboring area to the south, Fairbanks, 
increased by 69% between 2000 and 2010 (Zheng 2011), to nearly six hundred thousand 
residents.1 In addition, as with many Houston suburbs, that population is relatively affluent: 
in 2016, median household income for US Census tracts encompassing Cypress ranged from 
$89,000 to over $138,000, versus an average for Harris County of around $55,000. Generally, 
Cypress homeowners2 have been rewarded for locating in the area, enjoying estimated capital 
nity Survey, 5-Year Estimates (2012-6); retrieved Feb. 2018.
1 One subdivision in Fairbanks, the 11,400-acre Bridgeland, added 1,400 owner-occupied housing units from 2006-11 
(Zheng op. cit.).
2 Most Cypress residents own their homes: housing tenure data show that 80.8-94.5% of housing units in the area are 
owner-occupied, versus 54.5% for Harris County as a whole (US Census Bureau, op. cit.).
Figure 12: Cypress and Fairbanks, Texas, development pattern, with overlay of mapped floodplains. 
(Note: mapped floodplains incorporate both the base/100-year and 500-year flood zones.) Source: Harris 
County Appraisal District, FEMA, ESRI.
60
Haney 2018
gains of 63.7% over the period 2000-16.1
Cypress makes an intriguing example for this paper because it should not, by its elevation 
and topographic characteristics, be very susceptible to flooding. Lying between 110 and 175 
feet above sea level, it is outside the Buffalo Bayou watershed, historically the epicenter 
of flooding activity in Harris County. The area is drained by the relatively benign Cypress 
Creek—which flows to the northeast and empties into Spring Creek, along Harris County’s 
northern border—and by its main tributary, Little Cypress Creek, to the north. The Cypress 
Creek watershed was mapped in the 1940s, and in the 1950s, the HCFCD undertook projects 
to straighten and dig drainage channels along a thirty-mile stretch of the waterway, between 
US 290 and its confluence with Spring Creek.2 For several decades afterward, the area was 
largely overlooked in Harris County’s flood and storm-water management plans. In 1985, 
twelve years after Harris County joined the NFIP, FEMA produced a comprehensive FIRM 
for the Cypress area, which revealed a broad, roughly three-mile-wide swath of undeveloped 
land between Cypress and Little Cypress Creeks, with US 290 running through the middle. 
As can be seen in Figure 12 (previous page), much of the early development of this area, 
in the period after 1991, occurred outside the mapped floodplains. Prior to Tropical Storm 
Allison, there were only two major flood events in the fast-developing Cypress Creek 
watershed: in October 1994 and October 1998, the latter of which prompted the formation of 
the Cypress Creek Flood Control Coalition (CCFCC) by local residents.3 The CCFCC records 
1,505 reports of storm-related flooding incidents by homeowners in the Cypress and Little 
Cypress watersheds between May 1989 and October 1998, and over 1,000 incidents in June 
2001 alone, as a result of Allison.4 This increase can be explained by the three factors that 
represent the central themes of this thesis: the heightened severity of the storm itself; the 
1 According to data from Zillow Research; not inflation adjusted.
2 HCFCD.
3 CFCC.
4 Ibid. and HCFCD.
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Figure 13: Locations of buildings damaged by Hurricane Harvey in Cypress, TX, area, relative to 
FEMA mapped floodplains. (Note: as in the previous figure, mapped floodplains incorporate both the 




increase in population and real estate value adjacent to the area’s floodplains; and changes in 
the flood mechanics of the watershed resulting from the development of the built environment 
over time, which was not reflected in the FIRMs.
Cypress was included in TSARP’s comprehensive remapping efforts, and in 2001 the HCFCD 
issued a storm water management plan for the watershed. Despite the omens of Allison, most 
of Cypress was still rated by FEMA as non-hazardous (“zone X”) on the new, supposedly more 
accurate D-FIRMS. When Harvey struck, approximately 80.5% of the damaged buildings 
were located outside any mapped floodplain (see Figure 13, previous page). Ultimately, even 
these improved maps could not have accounted for the massive surge in development over 
the decade between their issuance and Harvey’s devastation, which had taken its toll on 
the watershed’s flood mechanics. In fact, as this paper has argued, the much-ballyhooed 
technological wizardry of the 2007 D-FIRMs may have even encouraged development just 
outside the remapped floodplain’s boundary, which was perceived as a “safety signal,” a 
green light to build and purchase houses in these marginal areas. Perhaps more directly, the 
widespread perception of low flood risk almost certainly contributed to the low levels of NFIP 
policy penetration in these areas: less than one in three Cypress households carried flood 
insurance in September 2017 (see Figure 14, facing page).1
The next section will present the results of GIS-based spatiotemporal analysis of development 
patterns suggested by this case study. The analysis will compare changes over time in the 
appraised value of specific elements of the built environment in three distinct floodplain 
zones: zone X, or those areas located outside the 500-year floodplain boundary, which FEMA 
deems to be “minimal hazard”; zone B, or what is termed the “marginal 100-year” floodplain, 
the areas between the 500-year and 100-year floodplain boundaries; and an amalgamation of 
the SFHAs, including the 100-year floodplain boundaries (zones V & A) and floodways.
1 Based on an analysis of NFIP data covering policies in force (“PIF”) per block group.
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Figure 14: NFIP policies in force (PIF) per housing units, by block group, with an overlay of FEMA 
mapped (100-year and 500-year) floodplains. Block groups were selected that are contained by or 
intersect with the custom Cypress boundary used in this section. Of the 30,020 households in the study 
area, 9,719 NFIP PIFs in September 2017, or 32.4%. Source: NFIP, FEMA, ESRI.
V. RESULTS OF SPATIOTEMPORAL ANALYSIS
As mentioned above, tax appraisal data compiled by HCAD are available dating back to 
2005. However, the analysis in this section will focus on the August “certified” appraisal 
values from 2009 to 2017, for two reasons. First, updated FIRMs, produced as part of the 
TSARP program, were adopted by Harris County in the summer of 2007, and it can be 
assumed that it took some time for developers to adjust to the changes in the flood maps. 
The first set of appraisal values to account for a full year of development activity following 
the TSARP changes would therefore date from 2009. Using this starting point has the added 
advantage that the 2009 appraisals would have been the first to occur after the downturn 
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in the US housing market. The S&P Case-Shiller National Home Price Index peaked in 
November 2007, but many urban markets were still experiencing buoyant pricing in the 
first half of 2008, when HCAD would have organized its appraisals for that year. Beginning 
the analysis with the August 2009 appraisal values—which would fully reflect the collapse 
in home prices—would ignore the surge in prices that occurred in 2005-7, while providing 
a suitable “base year,” for which it can be safely assumed that the bottoming out in prices 
across Harris County was market-based and unrelated to any flood zone considerations. 
In other words, many of the layers of hedonic variables that affect home prices—including 
whether or not a given property is located within or adjacent to a mapped floodplain—could 
be assumed to be somewhat moot in 2009, subordinated to the comprehensive downward 
swing of the market.
Table C (facing page) presents a summary of aggregate appraisal values for the parcels 
associated with each of the representative flood zones, “V/A” (SFHA, or 100-year floodplain), 
“B” (marginal 100-year floodplain), and “X” (non-hazardous areas), in both 2009 and 2017. 
As discussed above, HCAD separates its appraisals into constituent values, including: 
the underlying land, improvements, extra features, and agricultural resources. The 
“improvements” category is further subdivided into either newly constructed structures 
or additions/substantial renovations of existing structures. (Extra features are defined as 
uninhabitable annex structures, such as detached garages, sheds, pools, etc., located on the 
parcel.) This fine-grain classification allows a careful examination of the character of changes 
in appraisal values over time. As discussed, the values of improvements (in particular new 
construction) are taken as proxies for development activity within each parcel.
This thesis has argued that, if the delineation of floodplains by FEMA—with the associated 
disparities in construction and insurance costs under the NFIP—does indeed create an 
economic incentive to build within the marginal floodplain, then this phenomenon should 
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be observable in development activity in zone B, compared to zones V/A and X, represented, 
in this case study, by changes in the appraised values within each zone. At first glance, 
the results of the analysis suggest that the hypothesized relationship is not cut-and-dry: as 
shown in Figure 15 (next page), zone X has experienced the highest growth in total appraised 
value from 2009-17, of over $143 billion, versus approximately $16.5 billion for $24 billion 
for zones V/A and B, respectively. The normalized growth rates of total appraised value tell 
a similar story: zone X values grew by 71.1% over the study period, versus 64.4% for zone B 








X (Non-Hazardous) 1,064,633 1,064,652 0.002%
Total Appraised Value of Parcels
V/A $27,725,355,692 $44,192,918,418 59.4%
B $37,529,879,048 $61,697,742,533 64.4%
X $201,645,022,299 $344,945,208,242 71.1%
Appraised Value of Improvements
V/A $15,570,899,196 $24,251,539,195 55.8%
B $23,491,927,552 $41,999,711,174 78.8%
X $129,172,972,306 $216,218,754,928 67.4%
Table C: Summary of aggregate appraisal values for Harris County tax parcels, in 2009 and 2017, by 
FEMA flood zone, along with the gross number of recorded parcels in each year. Source: HCAD.
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Figure 15: Change in aggregate appraisal values of Harris County tax parcels, 2009-17, by FEMA 
flood zone. Note that Zone X parcels experienced the largest increase in gross appraisal values (mostly 
due to the fact that they account for about three-quarters of all parcels) as well as in the normalized, 
or relative rate of growth over the study period. Other proxies for economic exposure are the various 
contituent components of the total appraisal value. Source: HCAD.
Figure 16: Percent change in total appraisal values of Harris County tax parcels, 2009-17, by FEMA 




(see Figure 16, facing page). Much of the growth in zone X, however, can be explained by an 
increase in the appraised value of land in that zone. The land underlying parcels in zone X 
appraised 73.5% higher in 2017 than in 2009; the same figure for zone V/A was 58.9% and for 
zone B was 57.2%, both of which are closer to the average growth in land values for all Harris 
County tax parcels, which was 41%. From 2009 to 2017, land’s share of the total appraised 
value of zone X parcels remained mostly steady, rising by only fifty basis points to 33.7%. 
Land’s share of the total appraised value for zone B parcels, however, fell by 147 basis points 
over the period, to 31.9%.1
For zone B, the gap was filled by an increase in the appraised value of improvements. 
Focusing on just these elements provides greater evidence of the underlying hypothesis. As 
shown in Figure 17, the appraised value of improvements in zone B grew by 78.8% from 
1 It is possible that the reason zone X land values have risen so much faster than those of zones V/A and B is that 
appraisers are keenly aware (perhaps moreso than either builders or homeowners) of flood risk. In other words, these findings 
suggest that land values “price in” information concerning flood risk more comprehensively than the value of structural ele-
ments. Since the price of land, or “land basis,” is often the most signficant component of the development cost structure, one 
conclusion is that appraisers’ attempts to signal flood risk through land valuation has the unintended consequence of making 
the relative basis lower (i.e., land costs cheaper) in zones V/A and B than in zone X, a further incentive to build in these more 
hazardous areas.
Figure 17: Percent change in appraised value of improvements of Harris County tax parcels, 2009-17, 
by FEMA flood zone. Source: HCAD.
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2009-17, as more than $18.5 billion of value was added or created in the marginal 100-year 
floodplain. Over the same period, the appraised value of zone X parcels grew by 67.4%, while 
the same figure for zone V/A was 55.8% higher. This indicates that relatively more investment 
poured into zone B than into the two other zones under consideration over the nine years 
after the changes to Harris County’s flood maps under TSARP came into effect. Figure 18 
illustrates the constituent elements of the appraisal values for zone B parcels, both before 
and after the FIRMs were redrawn. It is significant to note that the substantial increases in 
the value of improvements—allowing for the overall decline of development activity following 
the housing market downturn in 2008-9—began after the adoption of the improved FIRMs 
in June 2007. The disparity between zone B and zones V/A and X is even greater when one 
separates the category of expenditures related to the construction of entirely new structures—
either rebuilt housing units or new subdivisions—from general improvements. This measure 
of new real estate investment increased by 138.8% in zone B from 2009-17, versus 51.8% 
in zone V/A, and 64.5% in zone X (see Figure 19, facing page). This finding is supported by 
Figure 18: Constituent elements of appraisal values for zone B parcels, 2009-17. (Note: “Other” 
includes extra features and agricultural resources.) Source: HCAD.
June 2007: New FIRMs Adopted
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the rate of growth in the number of parcels created over the study period,1 which was more 
than thirteen times faster in zone B than in zone X.2 As a result of this relatively fast clip of 
new construction activity, by 2017, zone B had the highest average tax assessment value per 
parcel of any of the zones: nearly $342,000, about 5.5% higher than zone X (see Figure 20, 
next page). In sum, it can be said that the “exposure” variable of the foregoing risk model has 
been increasing faster in zone B over the study period than in either zone V/A or zone X—
therefore, the measure of socioeconomic risk employed in this thesis has increased fastest in 
Harris County’s marginal 100-year floodplain than elsewhere.
Considered in the context of the incentive theory developed above, as well as the anecdotal 
evidence reviewed in the case study in Section IV, these results suggest that the introduction 
of the new FIRMs acted as a spur to development activity on the immediate periphery of the 
1 Via subdivision.
2 0.02% for zone B versus 0.0018% for zone X; the absolute number of parcels added in zone B was also 2.3 times 
greater than in zone X, despite the latter’s much greater size. In terms of both absolute and relative growth, however, zone 
V/A, surprisingly, posts the highest numbers, which may be explained by a study of the LOMAs/LOMRs in this zone.
Figure 19: Percent change in value of new construction activity within Harris County tax parcels, 
2009-17, by FEMA flood zone. Source: HCAD.
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Figure 20: Total appraised value per tax parcel, Harris County, August 2017, by FEMA flood zone. 
Source: HCAD.
SFHAs. Further, since the growth in improvement values in zone B outpaced zone X, it can be 
posited that absolute distance from perceived danger, as represented by the official boundary 
of the 100-year floodplain, was not the main concern of Harris County’s homebuilders (and 
home-improvers) over the past decade. Instead, the main driver appears to be satisfying the 
condition of being outside the official FEMA 100-year floodplain boundary. Whether this 
reflects an informed (though mistaken) perception of flood risk on the part of homebuilders 
and owners; total ignorance of that risk; a desire to avoid FMR’s and additional construction 
and maintenance costs; or other hedonic factors; or, most likely, some combination of all four, 
is a matter of further study.
V. CONCLUSION
The challenge to cities posed by natural disasters results from the confluence of three long-
term factors explored in this thesis: population growth and migration patterns that have 
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brought vast multitudes of people to live, work, and travel in littoral and riparian areas; 
the observed increase in the frequency and severity of natural hazards in these areas, 
particularly weather-related events such as severe storms and flooding; and finally, the real 
estate investment decisions of individuals and businesses in response to these hazards. As 
discussed, these decisions take the form of either risk mitigation—which may have a direct 
impact on the built environment in the form of dams, levees, raised foundations, etc.—or 
risk transfer, which is the domain of financial markets that seek to indemnify, in exchange 
for a fixed payment (or premium), the bearers of disaster risk. This thesis has argued that 
this process also exerts a significant influence on the urban fabric by shaping both the risk 
perceptions and economic incentives of individuals and firms, through the mechanism of 
flood insurance rate maps, or FIRMs.
The focus of this study has been the National Flood Insurance Program of the US, and 
the FIRMs that its parent agency, FEMA, produces as a transparent method of setting the 
program’s premiums. It is worth restating the intentions of HUD Secretary Weaver, one of 
the original proponents of the NFIP: “...flood insurance premiums which place the full costs 
on those benefiting from [high-hazard areas] can operate to keep unwarranted occupancy to 
a minimum.”1 Yet, contrary to the intended purpose, spatiotemporal analysis of development 
patterns in Harris County, Texas, reveals evidence that the act of delineating floodplain 
boundaries leads to distorted incentives, which encourages modes of development in flood-
prone areas that are antithetical to the public policy goal of resilient communities and that—
if the NFIP premiums were actuarially sound—would otherwise be uneconomic to pursue 
(because the costs of indemnification would be high). Though tax appraisal data does provide 
a glimpse of this disparity in development activity between various flood zones, further study 
would be required linking these findings to NFIP penetration rates, LOMA/LOMR revisions, 
1 Loc. cit. (page 20, note 2); emphasis added.
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subsidies, repetitive loss properties, buyouts of SRLPs,1 etc., to fully map the constellation of 
economic incentives that the program engenders—and to begin to realign them in a way that 
increases resiliency in the face of natural hazards.
Policy implications of these findings include a shift from a hard boundary for SFHAs to a 
finer gradation of flood risk ratings between various zones, with a system of variable pricing 
of risk premiums; or an extension of enhanced building and mitigation regulations to areas 
outside the 100-year floodplain, to equalize incentives. There would, of course, be trade-offs 
to any such changes. For example, enhanced building standards may translate into higher 
home prices, which would reduce affordability. In addition, there are the larger questions of 
what role the public sector should ultimately play in shaping individual incentives, and how 
to balance the fiscal objectives of a federal program with the urban planning goals of cities 
such as Houston. Due to these challenges, any reforms of the flood insurance system would 
be devilishly difficult to implement, but some kind of policy response is urgently needed. 
Evidence of a relationship between the FIRMs and patterns of real estate development does 
exist, and this relationship has consequences for the ability of urban populations to cope 
with hurricanes, floods, and other natural disasters. The NFIP’s mountain of unserviceable 
debt hints at the problem lying at the heart of the program’s system of incentives, and recent 
catastrophes visited on the Houston area by Hurricane Harvey (or on Naples, Florida, by 
Hurricane Irma, or on the US territory of Puerto Rico by Hurricane Maria, etc.) illustrate 
the level of exposure, in lives and property, to the ravages of natural disasters. These regions 
are in dire need of an insurance system that discourages risky development and rewards 
mitigation, preparation, and perhaps, relocation. Only then will policymakers have heeded 
the parable of the wise and foolish builders in the Gospel of Matthew, and built their flood 
insurance system on rock, rather than sand.
1 A difficulty with analyzing SRLP data is that, for privacy reasons, they are not geocoded to specific addresses, but 
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